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 Metacomprehension refers to the ability to judge one’s own comprehension. Studies in 
the literature have shown that generating keywords after reading helps adults and children make 
comprehension judgments that are better correlated with their actual comprehension. Researchers 
have also found that when metacomprehension is framed in terms of confidence, there is an 
effect of ability, where individuals with low ability tend to be overconfident in their judgments, 
while those with high ability tend to be underconfident. This paper describes two experiments 
investigating metacomprehension in seventh graders. 
 Experiment 1 sought to replicate and extend the finding that generating keywords after 
reading improves the accuracy of comprehension judgments and the effectiveness of study 
choices. To account for potential effects of time on task, participants in the control condition 
were asked to read passages twice in lieu of generating keywords. Two measures of 
metacomprehension accuracy (signed differences and gamma correlations) were based on 
comprehension judgments taken at two time points (pre-test and post-test). The moderating 
effects of reading ability were also examined.  
 The results of Experiment 1 showed that participants were overconfident in their 
judgments of their own comprehension. Overconfidence was greater for pre-test predictions than 
for post-test reflections, and it was also greater for participants with lower reading ability. 
	  Generating keywords caused participants to become significantly less overconfident– or more 
accurate– from pre-test to post-test in their comprehension judgments, but it did not actually 
boost comprehension scores. In other words, generating keywords helped participants know that 
they did not know; it did not, however, help them know more.  
 In Experiment 2, the investigation of generating keywords and rereading text was situated 
within a new context incorporating practice test questions. Studies have shown that practice 
testing is an effective study strategy. Additionally, since researchers have found that learners can 
use information about peer performance as a basis for making judgments about themselves, 
Experiment 2 also asked whether peer collaboration might increase metacomprehension 
accuracy. Participants were randomly assigned to four conditions: individual/keyword, 
individual/reread, collaborate/keyword, and collaborate/reread. All participants answered 
practice test questions; participants in the individual conditions worked on the questions alone, 
while participants in the collaborative conditions discussed the questions with a partner.  
 As in Experiment 1, participants in Experiment 2 were also overconfident in judging their 
own comprehension. Again, there was an effect for time of judgment, such that predictions were 
more overconfident than were reflections. Surprisingly, peer collaboration was found to lead to 
greater overconfidence in comprehension judgments. Participants who collaborated with a peer 
were more overconfident than participants who worked alone. Experiment 2 showed that in the 
presence of practice testing and peer collaboration, the interactive effect of keyword generation 
and time of judgment was minimized. Within the keyword group, participants who collaborated 
and participants who worked alone did not differ in overconfidence. Within the reread group, 
however, participants who collaborated were significantly more overconfident than those who 
worked alone. 
	   Taken together, these two studies suggest that middle school students are generally 
overconfident in their judgments of comprehension. However, the results indicate that study 
strategies designed to enhance comprehension and learning can be effective in reducing students’ 
overconfidence about themselves. 
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 As Charles Darwin (1871) cautioned in The Descent of Man, “ignorance more frequently 
begets confidence than does knowledge” (p. 3). Darwin’s comment was directed at those who 
continued to insist that the origin of humankind was a problem that could never be solved by 
science. Nearly a century and a half later, Nate Silver (2012) issued the following warning in The 
Signal and the Noise: “the amount of confidence someone expresses in a prediction is not a good 
indicator of its accuracy- to the contrary, these qualities are often inversely correlated” (p. 203). 
Silver was discussing failures of predictions among stock traders, political pundits, weather 
forecasters, and sports bettors.  
 Both Darwin and Silver were referring to a specific case of confidence– overconfidence– 
in which individuals rate their own competence more highly than is warranted by their actual 
accomplishment. Researchers studying cognitive bias and decision making have suggested that 
overconfidence is rooted in two different sources: a lack of knowledge or skill, and also a 
misperception about the self and about others. With regards to the first source, the double-curse 
hypothesis holds that individuals who lack the skills to produce a correct answer in the first place 
also necessarily lack the skills to determine whether that answer is right or wrong (Kruger & 
Dunning, 1999). With regards to the second source, studies from the social psychology literature 
have found an above-average effect, where the majority of people tend to (incorrectly and 
impossibly) believe that they are better than the average person (e.g., Alicke, 1985; Brown, 
1986; Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989).  
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 One way to account for overconfidence as well as underconfidence is to attribute both to 
a failing of metacognition. Simply put, metacognition can be defined as thinking about thinking, 
or knowing about knowing (Flavell, 1979). Most definitions of metacognition consist of two 
components: knowledge of cognitive processes, and control of cognitive processes (Hacker, 
1998; Jacobs & Paris, 1987, Kuhn & Dean, 2004). Others have invoked the notion of levels of 
processing, suggesting that metacognition involves the interplay between a cognitive level, 
where memory, attention, comprehension, and learning occur, and a metacognitive level, which 
monitors and controls the activity occurring at the cognitive level (Nelson & Narens, 1990; 
1994). Ultimately, the importance of metacognition is that it allows a learner to control his or her 
own learning and understanding (Nelson & Narens, 1990).  
 Cognitive psychologists often separate metacognition into two types of knowing: 
knowing when you know and knowing when you do not know (Metcalfe & Finn, 2013). In a 
now (in)famous news briefing given in 2002, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
added a third when he made the following statement: “as we know, there are known knowns; 
there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we 
know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones 
we don't know we don't know.” Social psychologists studying optimism and pessimism in 
relation to performance have contributed a fourth: unknown knowns- things we do not realize we 
know, and that we may therefore be pleasantly surprised to discover that we actually do know 
(Krueger & Mueller, 2002; Shepperd, Ouellette, & Fernandez, 1996; Wedell & Parducci, 2000).    
 The current research focuses on metacognition in relation to reading comprehension– 
commonly referred to as metacomprehension. Metacomprehension involves people’s ability to 
judge their comprehension of text (Dunlosky & Lipko, 2007). Like metacognition, 
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metacomprehension involves two components: evaluation of the quality of comprehension, and 
regulation of strategy use to address comprehension gaps (Huff & Nietfeld, 2009). Both 
components are essential to effective learning from text: metacognitive readers can detect 
instances in which their comprehension breaks down due to inadequate skills, and then select and 
apply appropriate strategies to repair their comprehension (Williams & Atkins, 2009). 
Additionally, if learners can distinguish between well-learned and less well-learned material, 
they can focus their efforts on unlearned material and avoid wasting time (Dunlosky & Lipko, 
2007).  
 While most studies in the metacomprehension literature have involved adults, de Bruin, 
Thiede, Camp, and Redford (2011) investigated metacomprehension accuracy in elementary and 
middle school students. Students were randomly assigned to either a keyword condition, in 
which they were asked to generate a list of keywords about a text after reading but before testing, 
or to a no-keyword control condition. In the experiment, participants read several text passages, 
either generated or did not generate keywords, made comprehension judgments, and took 
comprehension tests. The researchers found that for the middle school students, 
metacomprehension accuracy was significantly greater in the keyword group than in the no-
keyword group; however, elementary students in both conditions made many inaccurate 
judgments, and the two groups did not differ. When asked to select texts for restudy, the middle 
school students based their study choices on their comprehension judgments, choosing texts they 
perceived as less well-learned. The elementary students also based their study choices on their 
comprehension judgments, but because those judgments were inaccurate to begin with, they 
actually ended up choosing the wrong texts to restudy (de Bruin et al., 2011).  
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 In addition to being the first study in the literature to examine metacomprehension in 
children, the work of de Bruin and her colleagues (2011) demonstrates the importance of 
metacomprehension accuracy: learners who are accurate– that is, neither overconfident nor 
underconfident– in their judgments of their own comprehension can study much more effectively 
than learners who are inaccurate. For students, the inability to make accurate judgments can have 
serious consequences, such as studying the wrong material or terminating study prematurely. 
According to Metcalfe and Dunlosky (2008), one of the most compelling reasons for 
investigating metacognitive and metamemory judgments is that those judgments presumably 
guide learners’ subsequent study behavior and learning gains. Given the reading scores from the 
most recent administration of the National Assessment of Educational Progress, where only 35 
percent of fourth graders and 36 percent of eighth graders performed at or above the proficient 
level (National Center for Education Statistics, 2013), we might ask whether this low 
performance is due to poor metacomprehension, and if so, whether and how metacomprehension 
accuracy can be improved. 
 Evidence from social psychology and cognitive psychology suggests that two factors that 
could help address these questions are ability and collaboration. Kruger and Dunning (1999) 
linked inaccurate judgments about oneself with both academic achievement and peer perception, 
proposing that while low-achieving students tend to incorrectly assess their own performance, 
high-achieving students know how well they themselves performed on a test or task but 
overestimate how well others are doing on the same task or test. In other words, overconfidence 
among low achievers stems from an error about the self, while underconfidence among high 
achievers stems from an error about others. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) theorized that when 
individuals make estimates, they employ an anchoring and adjustment heuristic, in which they 
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use existing information as a starting point and then modify the value of their estimate until a 
plausible result is obtained. In accordance with cognitive anchoring theory (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), collaborating with others may provide learners with more accurate anchors on 
which to base their comprehension judgments. 
 
Overview of the Current Research 
 
 
 The current research comprises two experiments that asked whether or not keyword 
generation affects the accuracy of seventh graders’ comprehension judgments and also whether 
or not those judgments can then be applied in order to make effective study choices.  
 The purpose of Experiment 1 was to extend the finding that generating keywords after 
reading improves the accuracy of comprehension judgments and the effectiveness of study 
choices. A goal of Experiment 1 was to compare keyword generation to a stronger control 
condition than existing studies have used. Since the literature has shown that rereading– that is, 
restudying text again after an initial reading– is one of the most frequently used study techniques 
(e.g., Dunlosky, Rawson, Marsh, Nathan, & Willingham, 2013), it was adopted for use as a 
control condition. Two measures of metacomprehension accuracy (signed differences and 
gamma correlations) were based on comprehension judgments taken at two time points (pre-test 
and post-test). The moderating effects of reading ability were also examined.  
 In Experiment 2, the comparison of keyword generation to rereading text was situated 
within a new study context incorporating practice testing. A new variable, peer collaboration, 
was added. Of primary interest was whether the effect of keyword generation on 
metacomprehension accuracy and study regulation would continue to hold in the presence of 
practice testing and peer collaboration. 
  




REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
 
 The current research seeks to investigate the effect of keyword generation on 
metacomprehension accuracy and study regulation in middle school students. Two experiments 
were designed to explore whether or not keyword generation affects the accuracy of seventh 
graders’ comprehension judgments and also whether or not those judgments can then be applied 
in order to make effective study choices. This chapter reviews the literature on 
metacomprehension. It will begin with an overview of the pioneering work on calibration of 
comprehension that to this day remains the paradigm for metacomprehension research. Next, it 
will discuss two different measures of metacomprehension accuracy commonly used within the 
literature. Then, it will review a series of studies that have sought to experimentally manipulate 
metacomprehension accuracy. Finally, it will discuss the relationship between 
metacomprehension and collaboration.  
 
Pioneering Metacomprehension Research 
 
 
 Glenberg and Epstein (1985) are widely credited as being the very first researchers to 
study the construct now referred to as metacomprehension. In a series of studies (e.g., Epstein, 
Glenberg, & Bradley, 1984; Glenberg, Wilkinson, & Epstein, 1982), the researchers examined 
participants’ ability to detect contradictions or inconsistencies embedded in text passages in 
relation to their confidence ratings about their comprehension and also to their actual 
performance on tests assessing comprehension of the passages. In those studies, the researchers 
found an illusion of knowing effect, in which, despite having provided high confidence ratings 
  
	   7 
about their understanding of a text, participants failed to detect the logical flaw that had been 
implanted in the text. In other words, participants’ positive appraisals of their own 
comprehension were incongruous with their low performance on the actual measures of 
comprehension.  
Recognizing that the illusion of knowing was an incomplete construct, since in addition to 
the possibility of overconfidence in the absence of knowledge, there was also the option of 
underconfidence when knowledge was in fact present, Glenberg and Epstein (1985) adopted the 
terms “well calibrated” and “poorly calibrated” to refer to learners, such that well calibrated 
individuals know when they know and know when they don’t know, while poorly calibrated 
individuals don’t know when they know and also don’t know when they don’t know.  
 Glenberg and Epstein (1985) conducted a series of three experiments in order to situate 
the illusion of knowing effect within a calibration framework. In the experiments, participants 
read short expository texts, made confidence judgments predicting their ability to draw correct 
inferences about each text, and answered true-or-false test questions requiring them to verify 
inferences about each text. Based on the confidence ratings and the test scores, point-biserial 
correlations were computed in order to obtain quantitative measures of calibration of 
comprehension.  
The first of these experiments investigated the effect of varying the time interval between 
reading a text and making a confidence rating about that text. The researchers hypothesized that 
delaying the confidence judgments would increase calibration accuracy because participants 
would be forced to base their judgments on comprehension of the text rather than on memory for 
the text. Participants were assigned to either an immediate-rating condition or a delayed-rating 
condition. The results showed that the difference between the mean point-biserial correlations for 
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the two conditions was not significant, and neither of the mean correlations was significantly 
different from zero (r = .07 for the immediate condition; r = .04 for the delayed condition). The 
researchers concluded that overall calibration of comprehension was very poor and that the 
elapsed time between reading texts and making confidence judgments did not appear to have an 
effect on calibration accuracy (Glenberg & Epstein, 1985).  
The second experiment in the series examined how participants’ expectations about a 
forthcoming test would affect their calibration accuracy. Participants were assigned to either a 
familiarization condition, in which participants completed a practice session with the text 
paragraphs and the test questions, or a control condition, in which participants simply read the 
practice texts without exposure to the test questions. As in the first experiment, the difference 
between the mean point-biserial correlations for the two conditions was not significant, and 
neither of the mean correlations was significantly different from zero (r = .06 for the control 
condition; r = .12 for the familiarization condition). Again, calibration was fairly poor, and the 
experimental manipulation did not appear to have an effect on calibration accuracy.  
In the third experiment, Glenberg and Epstein (1985) tested the hypothesis that the act of 
taking the inference test affected the accuracy of participants’ confidence judgments (as opposed 
to the confidence judgments affecting test performance). A new procedure was developed, in 
which after reading the texts, participants completed the following five steps: (1) made pre-test 
confidence judgments predicting their ability to draw correct inferences about each text, (2) 
answered true or false inference verification test questions about each text, (3) made post-test 
confidence judgments about their performance on the just-completed inference tests, (4) made 
new confidence judgments predicting their ability to correctly verify a new set of inferences 
about each of the previously-read and previously-judged texts, and (5) answered a new set of true 
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or false inference verification test questions. Essentially, Experiment 3 added a set each of 
retrospective judgments, new prospective judgments, and new inference questions to the 
procedure used in Experiments 1 and 2.   
For each of the participants in the study, three calibration scores were computed: initial 
calibration of comprehension, which involved initial confidence judgments about the texts and 
performance on the first inference test (1 and 2 in the above list); calibration of performance, 
which involved performance on the first inference test and retrospective confidence judgments 
about test performance (2 and 3); and recalibration of comprehension, which involved the 
second set of confidence judgments about the texts and performance on the second inference test 
(4 and 5). As expected from the results of the first two experiments, mean initial calibration was 
very low (r = .04) and was not significantly different from zero. Mean calibration of performance 
(r = .23) was significantly different from zero and from mean initial calibration. Mean 
recalibration (r = .19) was significantly different from zero and from mean initial calibration.  
Glenberg and Epstein (1985) concluded that the results of Experiment 3 were consistent 
with the hypothesis that taking the inference test affected the calibration of participants’ 
confidence judgments. One explanation the researchers offered for this finding is that verifying 
the first set of inferences afforded participants the opportunity to detect flaws or inconsistencies 
in their cognitive representations of the texts, which in turn allowed them to be better informed 
when making the second set of confidence judgments (Glenberg & Epstein, 1985). In other 
words, in those cases where calibration was poor, the assessment of comprehension was likely to 
be based on incorrect or irrelevant information. However, once learners were encouraged to 
activate appropriate mental representations and to base their judgments accordingly, calibration 
was improved.  
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The lasting contribution of Glenberg and Epstein (1985) is that most metacomprehension 
research to date has been modeled after their paradigm. Experiment 3 revealed the existence of 
unanticipated causal pathways between metacognitive judgments and test performance. Rather 
than it being the case that metacognitive judgments affected or predicted the magnitude of test 
scores, the evidence suggested that the metacognitive judgments were susceptible to influence 
from previous testing. Several important lessons can be drawn from the work of Glenberg and 
Epstein (1985): first, calibration of comprehension is often very poor but can be improved; 
second, the ordering of steps in the procedure is critically important in metacomprehension 
studies; third, calibration accuracy is subject to the effects of practice and self-assessment; and 
finally, the difference between prospective and retrospective judgments is a promising area for 
future study. 
 
Measuring Metacomprehension Accuracy 
 
Measures of metacomprehension accuracy are based on the relationship between 
comprehension judgments and test scores. One method commonly used to operationalize 
metacomprehension accuracy is to compute a correlation between judgments of perceived 
comprehension and actual performance on a comprehension test. Because comprehension 
judgments often take the form of ratings or rankings, which are measured on ordinal rather than 
interval scales, non-parametric measures of correlation are thought to be more appropriate than 
the Pearson product-moment correlation (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954; Nelson, 1984). Although 
Glenberg and Epstein (1985) used point-biserial correlations, as the tests they used contained 
only dichotomous true-or-false items, most studies in the literature have since used multiple-
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choice items with more than two answer choices and, accordingly, have instead used gamma 
correlations1.  
Within the literature, metacomprehension accuracy as operationalized via gamma 
correlations is often referred to as resolution or relative accuracy. Resolution measures the 
degree to which an individual’s judgments correlate with his or her performance across texts 
(Dunlosky & Lipko, 2007), and assesses whether judgments increase monotonically with 
performance (Maki, 1998a; Schraw, 2009). Gamma ranges from –1 to +1, with stronger positive 
correlations indicating greater accuracy. To illustrate, suppose an individual read five texts, and 
responded to the prompt, “Given six test questions about each text, how many questions do you 
think you will answer correctly for each text?” with the following predictions: 4, 3, 5, 3, and 2. 
Suppose that he or she then took the tests and obtained the following scores: 5, 3, 4, 4, and 3. 
The gamma for this individual is 0.71, a moderately strong positive correlation. The individual 
here provided higher comprehension judgments for passages on which he or she obtained higher 
scores.  
Alternatively, metacomprehension accuracy can be operationalized as the signed 
differences between judgments and performance. The literature uses the terms confidence and 
absolute accuracy to refer to this measure. Signed differences provide an index of the degree to 
which an individual is underconfident or overconfident (Maki, 1998a; Schraw, 2009). Positive 
values indicate overconfidence, negative values indicate underconfidence, and zeroes indicate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Gamma is a non-parametric statistic that can be used when data are on an ordinal scale and when there 
are many ties in the data (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954; Nelson, 1984). Gamma is computed with the 
formula, G = (C – D)/(C + D), where a concordance (C) between two variables (e.g., metacomprehension 
judgment and test performance) occurs when one variable is increasing from one text to another and the 
other variable is also increasing across this same pair of texts, and where a discordance (D) occurs when 
one variable is increasing from one text to another and the other variable is decreasing across this same 
pair of texts (Nelson, 1984). 
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accuracy– neither overconfidence nor underconfidence. For the individual described in the 
preceding paragraph, subtracting each of the test scores from the corresponding prediction results 
in the following signed differences: -1, 0, +1, -1, and -1. Most of the values are negative, and the 
mean of the values is -0.4, indicating that the individual is underconfident in his or her 
predictions.  
There are different arguments for and against using each measure. Many studies in the 
literature have used gammas, so they can be compared across studies (Metcalfe & Finn, 2013). 
Another advantage is that gamma does not require that comprehension judgments and test scores 
be in the same units (Maki, 1998a). However, a problem with using gamma is that values are 
often very low: in two separate reviews of metacomprehension studies, researchers found that 
mean gammas did not exceed 0.30 (Dunlosky & Lipko, 2007; Maki, 1998b). Likewise, Kelemen, 
Frost, and Weaver (2000) computed test-retest reliability and found that while test scores, 
comprehension judgments, and signed differences were stable over time and across tasks, gamma 
correlations were not. A further disadvantage of using gamma correlations is that, unlike signed 
differences, they do not indicate overconfidence or underconfidence. On the other hand, a 
problem with signed differences is that overconfident and underconfident judgments can cancel 
each other. Squaring the values is an inadequate solution, since the sign of the deviation is as 
important as its magnitude.  
It seems that, alone, neither measure is sufficient. As further illustration, consider an 
individual who makes the predictions, 6, 5, 6, 6, and 5, and obtains the scores 3, 2, 5, 3, and 2. 
Because the judgments increased monotonically with the test scores, this individual has perfect 
resolution or relative accuracy with a gamma of 1. Subtracting each test score from the 
corresponding prediction results in the following values for confidence or absolute accuracy: +3, 
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+3, +1, +3, and +3. In this case, the mean of the values is +2.6, indicating that this individual is 
overconfident. Ignoring either measure would lead to very different interpretations. How could 
an individual be considered “accurate” despite having provided clearly incorrect and 
overconfident judgments? Maki (1998a) recommended that, when possible, researchers should 
include both measures in order to adequately understand the phenomenon. 
Maki, Shields, Wheeler, and Zacchilli (2005) investigated the effects of text difficulty and 
verbal ability on signed differences and gamma correlations. Participating college students read 
texts, made pre-test comprehension judgments, took comprehension tests, and made post-test 
judgments about their test performance. The researchers randomly assigned participants to a 
hard-text condition, in which they read texts from a GRE preparation manual; a revised-text 
condition, in which they read texts that had been revised to increase readability; and a mixed-text 
condition, in which they read both hard and revised texts. The participants were also classified 
into low, medium, and high ability groups based on their scores on the verbal portion of either 
the SAT or the ACT.  
Using signed differences, Maki and her colleagues (2005) found that, overall, low-ability 
students were overconfident while high-ability students were underconfident. In particular, low-
ability participants were overconfident in their pre-test predictions but accurate in their post-test 
judgments, while medium- and high-ability participants were accurate in their predictions but 
underconfident in their post-test judgments. Using gamma correlations, the researchers obtained 
values ranging from -0.02 to 0.64. However, the only significant main effect was for judgment 
type: post-test judgment gammas were significantly higher than pre-test judgment gammas, but 
neither verbal ability nor text difficulty had an effect on gamma (Maki et al., 2005).  
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Maki and her colleagues (2005) found that not only were signed differences and gamma 
correlations affected differently by text difficulty and verbal ability, the two measures were also 
uncorrelated. The researchers interpret this finding as an indication that the two measures may 
tap different processes altogether, or at least, may tap different aspects of metacomprehension 
(Maki et al., 2005). However, the researchers note that the gammas obtained in their study 
followed consistent patterns: almost all of the gammas were significantly different from zero, all 
of the post-test gammas were significantly greater than the pre-test gammas, and mean gammas 
for hard texts were higher (but not significantly so) than for revised texts. Maki and her 
colleagues (2005) conclude that, taken together, these results do not support the assertion that 
gamma is an unreliable and unstable measure (e.g., Kelemen et al., 2000).  
Following the example of Maki and her colleagues (2005), the current research includes 
signed differences as well as gamma correlations in an effort to obtain a more complete 
understanding of metacomprehension. Even if the two measures capture different aspects of the 
construct, assuming that both do in fact measure metacomprehension, the resulting 
interpretations should be consistent with one another. The current research also includes post-test 
reflections as well as pre-test predictions in order to replicate and extend the finding that post-
test judgments were more accurate than pre-test judgments for both measures of 
metacomprehension accuracy.  
 
Manipulating Metacomprehension Accuracy 
 
Another group of metacomprehension researchers has focused on the effects of keyword 
generation. Thiede, Anderson, and Therriault (2003) investigated the role of monitoring accuracy 
in regulation of learning. Participants in the study were asked to read several texts, make pre-test 
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comprehension judgments about each text, and take a comprehension test for each text. 
Monitoring accuracy was manipulated by having participants generate keywords immediately 
after reading each text, generate keywords at a delay after reading all of the texts, or not generate 
any keywords at all. After completing the tests, participants were told the number of items they 
had answered correctly. They were then given the opportunity to select texts for optional 
rereading and were tested once again. As in previous studies, metacomprehension accuracy was 
operationalized as the gamma correlations between the judgments and the test scores. 
The researchers found that the gamma correlations between pre-test comprehension 
judgments and test scores were significantly higher for the delayed-keyword group (M = .70) 
than for the immediate-keyword group (M = .23) or for the no-keyword group (M = .36). 
Additionally, the delayed-keyword group was significantly more likely than either of the other 
groups to select less-learned texts for restudy instead of better-learned texts. It was also the only 
group with significant score increases from the first test to the second test. 
Thiede and his colleagues (2003) suggest that the superior metacomprehension accuracy 
and study regulation of the delayed-keyword group can be explained by spreading activation 
theories of text comprehension (e.g., Britton & Gülgöz, 1991). They argue that when writing 
keywords immediately after reading, an individual may have information active in his or her 
working memory even for a text that was not well understood. However, when writing keywords 
at a delay, the individual is more dependent on long-term memory, and therefore, is in a better 
position to realize that he or she may have little to draw on when attempting to retrieve 
information about a poorly understood text. 
In a follow-up study, Thiede, Dunlosky, Griffin, and Wiley (2005) investigated several 
hypotheses for the delayed-keyword effect on metacomprehension accuracy. One potential 
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explanation involves the reading-keyword lag, or the elapsed time between reading and keyword 
generation; according to this account, delaying keyword generation forces a participant to access 
a situation model for a given text. A situation model is a mental representation that connects 
ideas within the text to other ideas contained in the text and to the reader’s prior knowledge 
about the text (Kintsch, 1988; 1998). A second possibility involves the keyword-keyword lag, or 
the time elapsed between generating keywords for one text and then another text; according to 
this explanation, the successive generation of keywords causes participants to judge the texts 
relative to each other. A third option involves the keyword-judgment lag; this explanation holds 
that minimizing the lag between generating keywords and judging comprehension inhibits 
forgetting of keyword-relevant information. The researchers conducted a series of experiments in 
order to systematically evaluate the three hypotheses, and found evidence in favor of the reading-
keyword lag hypothesis (Thiede et al., 2005). They found that spacing keyword generation and 
delaying comprehension judgments did not have an effect on metacomprehension accuracy, thus 
disconfirming the keyword-keyword lag and the keyword-judgment lag explanations for the 
delayed-keyword effect.  
Anderson and Thiede (2008) sought to determine whether the delayed-keyword effect 
would extend to summary writing in place of keyword generation. The researchers used a 
counterbalanced within-subjects design with three conditions: delayed summary, immediate 
summary, and no summary. Participants read several texts, made pre-test comprehension 
judgments, and took a test. As in previous studies, metacomprehension accuracy was 
operationalized as the gamma correlations between the judgments and the test scores. The 
researchers found that the participants had significantly higher metacomprehension accuracy 
when they wrote summaries at a delay than when they wrote summaries immediately or when 
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they did not write summaries. Anderson and Thiede (2008) concluded that the delayed-keyword 
effect does in fact extend to summary writing, and that the results of their study provide further 
support for the situation model hypothesis.  
The evidence from the work of Thiede and his colleagues suggests that the delayed-
keyword (and delayed-summary) effect is robust, and that the delayed-keyword manipulation 
should be included as a baseline condition in future metacomprehension studies. Indeed, the 
gamma correlation of .70 observed in the delayed-keyword condition of the Thiede et al. (2003) 
study is higher than any other value of gamma observed in any of the other studies included in 
this literature review. Additionally, the support for the situation model hypothesis indicates the 
importance of choosing text passages and test questions that require individuals to create and 
access situation models while reading.  
 
Metacomprehension and Collaboration 
 
 
 One important issue that metacomprehension researchers have not considered is the role 
of interpersonal interactions in learning and studying. Literacy learning is oftentimes social in 
nature, as students work with peers and teachers, asking and answering questions, arguing and 
defending opinions, and discussing and critiquing ideas. Even when working independently, 
readers must attempt to make sense of the motives, beliefs, and values of authors and characters, 
while writers must try to produce texts that will be coherent and convincing to others. Proponents 
of collaboration in the classroom argue that it encourages active participation, teaches children to 
work cooperatively, and prepares them for the transition into the workplace and society (De Lisi 
& Goldbeck, 1999; Fawcett & Garton, 2005). In fact, a key subset of standards within the newly 
adopted Common Core State Standards for English language arts is grouped together under the 
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heading, “Comprehension and Collaboration” (National Governors Association Center for Best 
Practices, Council of Chief State School Officers, 2010). 
 One type of a metacognitive skill that is social in nature is theory of mind. Theory of 
mind refers to an individual’s ability to construe people, including the self and others, as agents 
acting in accordance with their own desires, beliefs, and emotions (Wellman, 2011). In other 
words, theory of mind involves understanding that one has a mind and that others have their own 
minds as well. Flavell (2000; 2004) noted that the most salient difference between metacognition 
and theory of mind is that metacognition is idiosyncratic and introspective, while theory of mind 
involves an individual’s ability to understand others. Other researchers have argued that theory 
of mind is an essential social skill in that it allows individuals to regulate their relationships with 
others (Watson, Linkie-Nixon, Wilson, & Capage, 1999). 
 Harris, de Rosnay, and Pons (2005) use children’s comprehension of the story of Little 
Red Riding Hood to illustrate the development of theory of mind. In their example, children hear 
the story and are then asked two questions about it: (1) Who does Little Red Riding Hood think 
will answer the door- Grandma, or the Wolf, and, (2) How does she feel while knocking on the 
door- happy, or afraid? According to the researchers, children of different ages provide different 
answers that reflect their understanding of theory of mind: 3-year-olds incorrectly answer that 
Little Red Riding Hood expects the wolf to answer the door, 4- and 5-year-olds correctly answer 
that she expects Grandma to answer the door but incorrectly report that Little Red Riding Hood 
feels scared while knocking, and 6-year-olds can correctly answer that she expects Grandma to 
answer the door and that (therefore) Little Red Riding Hood is not scared as she knocks (Harris 
et al., 2005).  
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  In a study involving four- to six-year old children and their parents, Mar and his 
colleagues investigated whether exposure to children’s storybooks, movies, or television would 
predict children’s theory-of-mind development (Mar, Tackett, & Moore, 2010). Using measures 
based on the Author Recognition Test (ART) developed by Stanovich and West (1989), Mar and 
his colleagues presented parents with lists of storybook, movie, and television program titles 
containing both real items and foils, and asked them to identify the real items. The researchers 
found that children whose parents were better at recognizing storybook titles performed better on 
a battery of theory-of-mind tasks; in a hierarchical regression analysis, parents’ recognition of 
storybook titles predicted 26% of the variance in children’s theory-of-mind scores above and 
beyond age, sex, vocabulary, and parental income (Mar et al., 2010). Interestingly, recognition of 
movie titles also increased prediction of theory-of-mind scores by 33%; however, recognition of 
television program titles did not predict any additional variance.  
 Another area of research that illustrates the relationship between metacognition and 
collaboration is cognitive anchoring theory. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) suggested that when 
individuals make estimates, they often employ an anchoring and adjustment heuristic, in which 
they use existing numerical information as an anchor or starting point and then adjust the value 
of their estimate accordingly until a plausible result is obtained. Collaboration can provide such 
an anchor in that an individual can use his or her appraisal of another as a point of comparison 
for his or her own performance. Piaget (1959) emphasized the comparative nature of 
collaboration, arguing that by exposing the differences between one’s own knowledge and that of 
others, peer interactions promote cognitive conflict and change. When working with others, 
students encounter information about how others are performing, which can affect their self-
judgments (Zhao & Linderholm, 2011). According to Zhao and Linderholm (2011), with regards 
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to making metacomprehension judgments, collaborating with others may provide individuals 
with more accurate anchors on which to base their judgments about themselves.  
 In two experiments, Zhao and Linderholm (2011) investigated whether providing 
participants with information about typical peer performance would produce anchoring effects 
on their metacomprehension judgments. In the first experiment, college-aged participants were 
randomly assigned to either a high-anchor condition, where they were told that mean peer 
performance was 85%, a low-anchor condition, where they were told that mean peer 
performance was 55%, or a no-anchor condition, where no information about peer performance 
was provided. The researchers found that participants in the high-anchor and the no-anchor 
conditions made judgments that were significantly higher in magnitude than those made by the 
low-anchor group; in terms of accuracy, the high-anchor group was significantly less accurate 
(overconfident) than the low-anchor group. Zhao and Linderholm (2011) also found that the 
mean judgment given by participants in the no-anchor condition was 77%, or about a C/C+ on a 
typical college grading scale.  
 In the second experiment, the researchers tested whether adjusting the values of the 
anchors would produce more symmetrical anchoring effects. Using the mean judgment of the no-
anchor group as a midpoint, the researchers set the high anchor as 95% and the low anchor as 
55%. The results supported the symmetrical anchoring hypothesis, with the high-anchor group 
providing significantly higher judgments and the low-anchor group providing significantly lower 
judgments relative to the no-anchor group. As in the first Experiment , the low-anchor group had 
the highest absolute accuracy of the three groups. The researchers suggest that this might be 
because mean performance across the three groups on the comprehension test was generally low; 
50% in Experiment 1 and 45% in Experiment 2.  
  




 This chapter presented a review of the literature on metacomprehension. It reviewed the 
seminal studies that have informed and inspired much of the research on metacomprehension. It 
compared and contrasted two widely used measures of metacomprehension accuracy: signed 
differences and gamma correlations. It described the development and investigation of the 
keyword generation manipulation. It discussed the relationship between metacomprehension and 
collaboration.  
	   	  




EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF KEYWORD GENERATION (EXPERIMENT 1) 
 
 
 By middle school, much of the learning that students are expected to do will occur 
through independent reading of textual material. As students complete assigned readings and 
review class notes, they must assess, control, and repair their ongoing comprehension of the to-
be-learned information. The ability to monitor and regulate comprehension of text is often 
referred to as metacomprehension. Students who are better at knowing what they do and do not 
comprehend– that is, students who have greater metacomprehension accuracy– will be better 
able to learn from text. They will be able to selectively reread, memorize, and restudy as needed, 
and will consequently be more effective at regulating their study than students who are unable to 
be metacognitive about their comprehension.  
 De Bruin, Thiede, Camp, and Redford (2011) investigated metacomprehension accuracy 
and study regulation in elementary and middle school students. Students read several text 
passages, either generated or did not generate keywords, made judgments about how well they 
comprehended the text, and took comprehension tests. The researchers computed gamma 
correlations between comprehension judgments and test scores. For the middle school students in 
the study, gamma correlations were significantly higher in the keyword group than in the no-
keyword group, indicating that the keyword group had greater metacomprehension accuracy. 
However, elementary students in both conditions made many inaccurate judgments, and there 
was no difference in gamma correlations between the two conditions. When asked to select texts 
for restudy, the middle school students based their study choices on their comprehension 
judgments, choosing texts they perceived as less well comprehended. The elementary students 
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also based their study choices on their comprehension judgments, but because those judgments 
were inaccurate to begin with, they actually ended up choosing the wrong texts to restudy. This 
is the first study in the metacomprehension literature to involve children, and it shows the 
importance of metacomprehension accuracy for children as well as for adults: learners who are 
accurate in their judgments of their own comprehension can study more effectively than learners 
who are inaccurate.  
 In a study involving college students, Maki, Shields, Wheeler, and Zacchilli (2005) 
investigated the effects of verbal ability on metacomprehension accuracy. Participants read 
several passages, made pre-test judgments about their comprehension, took comprehension tests, 
and made post-test judgments about their comprehension. The researchers computed signed 
differences between comprehension judgments and test scores. They found that although 
students in all ability groups were generally inaccurate in their comprehension judgments, there 
was an effect of ability: students with lower verbal ability tended to be more overconfident while 
those with higher verbal ability were more underconfident. Time of judgment was also found to 
have an effect, such that overconfidence was higher for judgments made at pre-test than for 
judgments made at post-test.  
 Experiment 1 sought to extend the work of de Bruin and her colleagues. Their design, 
procedure, and materials were adopted for use here. Several changes were made. First, in order 
to control for time on task, Experiment 1 compared keyword generation to rereading text rather 
than to not generating keywords. Additionally, based on the work of Maki and her colleagues, 
Experiment 1 incorporated the following modifications into the paradigm developed by de Bruin 
and her colleagues: (1) participants made comprehension judgments after testing as well as 
before testing, (2) signed differences between comprehension judgments and test scores were 
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computed in addition to gamma correlations, and (3) the effect of reading ability on 
metacomprehension accuracy and study regulation was also examined. 
 
Questions and Hypotheses 
 
 
 Experiment 1 compared the effects of two strategies, keyword generation and rereading 
text, on metacomprehension accuracy and study regulation. It also examined the effects of time 
of judgment and reading ability. The following questions were addressed: 
1. Do middle school students tend to be accurate when making judgments about their own 
comprehension? If they are inaccurate, do they tend to be underconfident or 
overconfident? 
2. Do strategy condition and time of judgment affect whether middle school students are 
underconfident, accurate, or overconfident in their comprehension judgments?  
a. Do strategy condition and time of judgment affect metacomprehension accuracy 
as operationalized via signed differences? 
b. Do strategy condition and time of judgment affect metacomprehension accuracy 
as operationalized via gamma correlations? 
3. Do strategy condition and time of judgment affect study regulation among middle 
school students?  
4. Does reading ability have an effect on whether middle school students tend to be 
underconfident, accurate, or overconfident in their comprehension judgments? 
5. Do the effects of strategy condition and time of judgment on metacomprehension 
accuracy differ by ability group? 
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a. Does ability have a moderating effect when metacomprehension accuracy is 
operationalized via signed differences? 
b. Does ability have a moderating effect when metacomprehension accuracy is 
operationalized via gamma correlations? 
6. Do the effects of strategy condition and time of judgment on study regulation differ by 
ability group? 
A review of the literature on metacomprehension accuracy led to the following hypotheses for 
Experiment 1: 
1. Middle school students will be overconfident in their judgments of comprehension. 
De Bruin and her colleagues (2011) found that fourth, sixth, and seventh graders 
provided comprehension judgments that were higher than their actual test scores. Other 
studies of metacognitive monitoring have shown that children tend to overestimate their 
performance when making judgments of learning (e.g., Koriat & Shitzer-Reichert, 
2002). Thus, it is expected that participants will be overconfident in their judgments. 
2. Strategy condition and time of judgment will interact in their effects on 
metacomprehension accuracy. De Bruin and her colleagues (2011) found that 
generating keywords led to greater metacomprehension accuracy than not generating 
keywords. Maki and her colleagues (2005) found that post-test reflections were more 
accurate than pre-test predictions. It is expected that generating keywords will lead to 
better metacomprehension accuracy than rereading text, and that post-test reflections 
will be more accurate than pre-test predictions. 
3. Strategy condition and time of judgment will interact in their effects on study 
regulation. Improving metacomprehension accuracy via keyword generation will also 
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lead to an improvement in study regulation, as de Bruin and her colleagues (2011) 
found. Increasing the accuracy of a learner’s comprehension judgments will enable that 
learner to make more effective decisions about whether or not further study is required.  
4. Reading ability will have an effect on the accuracy of comprehension judgments. 
According to the double-curse hypothesis, individuals with low ability are doubly 
cursed in that not only do they lack the skills to produce a correct answer, they also lack 
the ability to determine whether an answer is correct or incorrect (Dunning, Johnson, 
Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003). Thus, it is expected that participants with low scores on the 
comprehension test will also have poor metacomprehension accuracy.  
5. The effects of strategy condition and time of judgment on metacomprehension 
accuracy will differ by ability group. De Bruin and her colleagues (2011) found that 
generating keywords improved metacomprehension accuracy for sixth and seventh 
graders but not for fourth graders. It is expected that, like the fourth graders, older 
struggling readers in this study may not benefit from keyword generation. 
6. The effects of strategy condition and time of judgment on study regulation will 
differ by ability group. Because participants in the low ability group are expected to 
make inaccurate comprehension judgments, it is also expected that their subsequent 







 A total of 109 seventh grade students (61 male and 48 female) from three 
demographically similar public schools in New York City participated in Experiment 1.  
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Design 
 
 A posttest-only control-group design was used. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two strategy conditions: (1) keyword or (2) reread. There were 55 participants in the 




 Participants completed the following activities in order in a single 70-minute-long 
experimental session: (1) they read five passages, (2) they either generated keywords about the 
passages or reread the passages (the experimental manipulation), (3) they made pre-test 
predictions, (4) they answered test questions about the passages, (5) they made post-test 
reflections, and (6) they chose passages for restudy. The activities were administered by the 
author in a typical classroom setting with the classroom teacher present. 
 Participants in the keyword condition were asked to generate five keywords that captured 
the meaning of each passage. Participants were given the following instructions: “A keyword is a 
word that captures the meaning or the essence of a text. For example, on a text entitled Titanic, 
possible keywords might be ship, iceberg, lifeboat, sink, and tragedy.” They did not receive any 
other training in keyword generation. Participants in the reread condition were presented with a 




 The materials were the same as those used by de Bruin and her colleagues (2011) in their 
study. They were obtained by writing to Anique de Bruin and Keith Thiede. All materials were 
presented to participants in a single printed test booklet. In order to account for potential effects 
of passage order, five different randomized orderings of the reading passages were generated 
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using a Latin square design. For each ordering of the passages, two versions of the test booklets 
were created, one for the keyword condition and one for the reread condition, resulting in a total 
of ten different versions of the test booklets. The ordering was maintained throughout the entire 
experimental procedure, such that participants who read Passage 1 first also generated keywords, 
answered test questions, made comprehension judgments, and made restudy choices about 
Passage 1 first. 
 Reading passages. Five cause-effect expository text passages covering topics related to 
life science were used. Word counts for the passages ranged from 294 to 418, and Flesch-
Kincaid reading grade levels for the passages ranged from 6.4 to 8.2. The passages had been 
developed so that important causal relationships among the propositions in the text were not 
explicitly stated; this was done to elicit deep comprehension on the level of the situation model 
(de Bruin et al., 2011; Wiley, Griffin, & Thiede, 2005). Appendix A contains the five passages, 
along with a table of word counts and readability statistics. 
 Test questions. A comprehension test with six multiple-choice questions accompanied 
each reading passage. There were thirty test questions in total (6 questions x 5 passages). One 
point was awarded for a correctly answered question; possible scores on each test ranged from 0 
to 6. Appendix B contains the test questions. 
 Comprehension judgment prompts. Participants were asked to make two different 
comprehension judgments about each reading passage: (1) pre-test predictions, which were made 
after reading but before testing, and (2) post-test reflections, which were made after reading and 
after testing. Participants made five predictions and five reflections, for a total of ten 
comprehension judgments. Predictions were prompted with the query, “Please circle how many 
of the six test questions you think you will answer correctly about the text entitled, [title].” 
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Reflections were prompted with, “Please circle how many of the six test questions you think you 
answered correctly about the text entitled, [title].” In response to the prompts, participants were 
asked to circle a number between 0 and 6. The comprehension judgment prompts are presented 
in Appendix C. 
 Study regulation prompts. Participants were asked to indicate whether or not they 
would spend additional time restudying a passage if they were to be given additional test 
questions. Study choices were prompted with the query, “Suppose we were to give you another 
test about the passages you have read and answered questions about. Would you want to reread 
or restudy this passage?” Participants were not required to actually restudy the passages; they 
were simply asked to indicate whether or not they would restudy each passage by circling “yes” 




 There were two dependent measures: (1) metacomprehension accuracy and (2) study 
regulation. Metacomprehension accuracy was operationalized in two different ways: (1a) as the 
signed differences between comprehension judgments and test scores, and (1b) as the gamma 
correlations between comprehension judgments and test scores. Study regulation was 





 The data from Experiment 1 were analyzed using a mixed 2 x 2 ANOVA, with strategy 
condition treated as a between-subjects variable (2 levels: keyword and reread) and time of 
judgment treated as a within-subjects variable (2 levels: prediction and reflection). A subsequent 
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analysis included ability (3 levels: high, medium, and low) as a between-subjects moderating 





 An exploratory analysis on comprehension judgments and test scores revealed three 
extreme outliers in the data. One was identified by inspection of a boxplot for values that were 
more than 3 box-lengths from the edge of the box, and two were identified as having Studentized 
residuals greater than +3 or less than -3. These three outliers were excluded from the analyses 
that follow, resulting in a total sample size of N = 106 with n = 53 participants in each condition. 
 Table 1 presents the characteristics of the participants by strategy condition. 
 
Table 1 
Characteristics of the Participants by Strategy Condition  
  Keyword (n = 53) Reread (n = 53) 
School A 34 31 
 B 13 14 
 C 6 8 
Age 11 years 4 1 
 12 years 48 46 
 13 years 1 6 
Gender Male 17 29 
 Female 36 24 
 
 Chi-square tests were conducted to detect differences in participant characteristics across 
the keyword and reread conditions. There was a significant difference in assignment to strategy 
condition for gender, χ2(1, N = 106) = 5.53, p = .019, such that the proportion of females was 
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higher in the keyword condition than in the reread condition2. There were no significant 
differences for age, χ2(2, N = 106) = 5.41, p = .067, or for school, χ2(2, N = 106) = 0.46, p = .79.  




Test Scores and Comprehension Judgments by Strategy Condition 
Condition Prediction Test Score Reflection Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Keyword  (n = 53) 0.77 0.13 0.58 0.18 0.68 0.15 
Reread  (n = 53) 0.72 0.16 0.56 0.18 0.71 0.15 
 
 Levene’s tests showed that the assumption of homogeneity of variances held for mean 
prediction (p = .10), mean test score (p = .97), and mean reflection (p = .94). Shapiro-Wilk’s 
tests were used to determine whether the assumption of normality held. Within the keyword 
condition, the assumption of normality was satisfied for mean test score (p = .20), but not for 
mean prediction (p = .009) or for mean reflection (p = .046). Within the reread condition, the 
assumption of normality was satisfied for mean prediction and mean reflection (p = .17 and p = 
.22, respectively), but not for mean test score (p = .024). Since ANOVA has been found to be 
robust to violations of normality (e.g., Feir-Walsh & Toothaker, 1974), we chose to proceed with 
the analyses with caution.  
 An ANOVA on mean predictions revealed an effect of strategy condition, F(1, 105) = 
4.06, p = .046, ηp2 = .038, such that mean prediction was significantly higher in the keyword 
condition than in the reread condition (M = 0.77 vs. M = 0.72). There was no difference between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Because the exploratory analysis revealed an effect for gender, an additional set of analyses was carried 
out to determine whether the effects of strategy condition and time of judgment on metacomprehension 
accuracy and study regulation differed by gender. Results indicated that gender did not moderate the 
effects of strategy condition and time of judgment on either metacomprehension accuracy or study 
regulation. The complete analysis is presented in Appendix E. 
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the keyword and reread conditions on mean test scores (M = 0.58 vs. M = 0.56), F(1, 105) = 
0.38, p = .54, or on mean reflections (M = 0.68 vs. M = 0.71), F(1, 105) = 1.25, p = .27. 
 
Metacomprehension Accuracy 
 Signed differences. Group means of the intra-individual signed differences between 
comprehension judgments (scored as a proportion out of 6 points) and test scores (scored as a 
proportion out of 6 points) across the five passages were computed. The means and standard 
errors for signed differences are presented in Figure 1. Zero values indicate accuracy, positive 
values indicate overconfidence, and negative values indicate underconfidence.  
 
Figure 1. Signed differences between comprehension judgments and test scores. 
 
 Question 1. Do middle school students tend to be accurate when making judgments about 
their own comprehension? If they are inaccurate, do they tend to be underconfident or 
overconfident? 
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 As shown in Figure 1, all of the signed differences between comprehension judgments 
and test scores were positive, indicating that participants were overconfident. One-sample t-tests 
were conducted to determine whether the signed differences were significantly different than 
zero. Within the keyword group, signed differences between test scores and predictions (M = 
0.19, SEM  = 0.028) were significantly different from zero, t(52) = 6.89, p < .001, as were those 
between test scores and reflections (M = 0.10, SEM  = 0.025), t(52) = 3.92, p < .001. Similarly, 
within the reread group, signed differences between test scores and predictions (M = 0.16, SEM  
= 0.029) were significantly different from zero, t(52) = 5.31, p < .001, as were those between test 
scores and reflections (M = 0.15, SEM  = 0.028), t(52) = 5.49, p < .001. 
 Hypothesis 1 was supported. The non-zero values for signed differences show that the 
comprehension judgments were inaccurate. That all of the signed differences were positive 
shows that students were overconfident in their judgments of comprehension.  
 Question 2a. Do strategy condition and time of judgment affect metacomprehension 
accuracy as operationalized via signed differences? 
 Hypothesis 2a. Strategy condition and time of judgment will interact in their effects on 
metacomprehension accuracy as operationalized via signed differences. 
 An ANOVA on signed differences showed a statistically significant interaction between 
time of judgment and strategy condition, F(1, 104) = 14.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .12. Because the 
interaction term was significant, simple main effects analyses were conducted. 
 There was a statistically significant simple main effect of time of judgment for the 
keyword group, F(1, 52) = 28.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .36. Within the keyword group, there was a 
bigger difference between predictions and test scores than between reflections at test scores (M = 
0.19 vs. M = 0.10), p < .001. In other words, overconfidence was greater for predictions than for 
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reflections. There was no effect of time of judgment within the reread group (M = 0.16 vs. M = 
0.15), F(1, 52) = 0.024, p = .88.  
 An analysis of simple main effects for strategy condition showed that the keyword and 
reread groups did not differ on overconfidence of predictions (M = 0.19 vs. M = 0.16), F(1, 105) 
= 0.77, p = .38, or of reflections (M = 0.10 vs. M = 0.15), F(1, 105) = 2.08, p = .15.  
 Hypothesis 2a was supported. Time of judgment and strategy condition interacted in their 
effects on metacomprehension accuracy as measured via signed differences. The accuracy of 
predictions differed from the accuracy of reflections within the keyword group but not within the 
reread group. Specifically, the keyword group became less overconfident from pre-test to post-
test while the reread group remained consistently overconfident. 
 Gamma correlations. Group means of the intra-individual gamma correlations between 
comprehension judgments and test scores across the five passages were computed. Potential 
values for gamma range from -1 to +1. Stronger positive values for gamma indicate better 
correlation between judgments and test scores, zero values indicate a lack of a relationship, and 
negative values indicate an inverse relationship.  
 Gamma correlations could not be computed for 3 students in the keyword group and 7 
students in the reread group because these students provided the same comprehension judgment 
for all five passages. As a result, the analysis was completed with n = 50 students in the keyword 
group and n = 46 in the reread group. Figure 2 presents the mean gamma correlations along with 
the standard errors for the keyword and reread groups.  
 As illustrated in Figure 2, all of the gamma correlations were small but positive, 
indicating that comprehension judgments were weakly related to test scores. Additionally, 
relative to the gammas, the standard errors were quite large.  
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Figure 2. Gamma correlations between comprehension judgments and test scores. 
 
 
 One-sample t-tests showed that within the keyword group, gammas between test scores 
and predictions (M = 0.061, SEM  = 0.095) were not significantly different from zero, t(49) < 1, 
p = .53, and neither were gammas between test scores and reflections (M = 0.068, SEM  = 
0.083), t(51) < 1, p = .42. Similarly, within the reread group, gammas between test scores and 
predictions (M = 0.015, SEM  = 0.10) were not significantly different from zero, t(47) < 1, p = 
.89, and neither were gammas between test scores and reflections (M = 0.14, SEM  = 0.10), t(48) 
= 1.32, p = .19. That none of the gamma correlations were significantly different than zero 
provides further support for the hypothesis that middle school students are inaccurate in their 
judgments about their comprehension. 
 Question 2b. Do strategy condition and time of judgment affect metacomprehension 
accuracy as operationalized via gamma correlations? 
 Hypothesis 2b. Strategy condition and time of judgment will interact in their effects on 
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 An ANOVA on gamma correlations indicated that the interaction between time of 
judgment and strategy condition was not statistically significant, F(1, 94) = 0.30, p = .59. The 
main effect of time of judgment was not statistically significant, F(1, 94) = 0.47, p = .49, nor was 
the main effect of strategy condition, F(1, 94) = 0.017, p = .90. 
 Hypothesis 2b was not supported. Time of judgment and strategy condition did not 
interact in their effects on metacomprehension accuracy as measured via gamma correlations. 
Neither time of judgment nor strategy condition had an effect on metacomprehension accuracy. 
 
Study Regulation 
 Study regulation was operationalized as the mean of the intra-individual gamma 
correlations between comprehension judgments (which ranged from 0 to 6) and restudy choices 
(which were scored as either 0 or 1, with 1 indicating that a text was selected for restudy and 0 
indicating that it was not). A stronger negative correlation indicates more effective study 
regulation in that participants chose to restudy texts perceived as less well learned (and did not 
choose to restudy texts perceived as well learned).  
 Gammas could not be computed for 9 students in the keyword group and 17 students in 
the reread group; these students made the same restudy choice for all five passages. Thus, the 
analysis was completed with n = 44 students in the keyword group and n = 36 in the reread 
group.  
 Figure 3 illustrates the study regulation gammas (means and standard errors) for the two 
groups. 
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Figure 3. Study regulation gammas by strategy condition.  
   
 All of the obtained gammas were negative, indicating that participants based their study 
choices on their comprehension judgments. One-sample t-tests showed that within the keyword 
group, gammas between study choices and predictions (M = -0.21, SEM  = 0.12) were not 
significantly different from zero, t(43) = -1.68, p = .10, and neither were gammas between study 
choices and reflections (M = -0.20, SEM  = 0.12), t(45) = -1.60, p = .12. However, within the 
reread group, gammas between study choices and predictions (M = -0.40, SEM  = 0.12) were 
significantly different from zero, t(37) = -3.41, p = .002, as were the gammas between study 
choices and reflections (M = -0.41, SEM  = 0.12), t(38) = -3.51, p = .001.  
 Strongly negative gammas are typically interpreted as showing more effective study 
regulation in that participants chose to restudy texts perceived as less well learned and did not 
choose to restudy texts perceived as well learned. An exploration of the test scores and restudy 
choices suggests that the latter half of the previous statement is the more likely explanation. 
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choose to restudy and who obtained lower scores on the comprehension tests. Table 3 presents 
the percentage of students in each condition choosing to restudy, along with the mean test score. 
 
Table 3 
Restudy Choices and Test Scores by Strategy Condition 
Condition Percent Choosing to Restudy Mean Test Score Mean SD Mean SD 
Keyword  (n = 53) 46.4% 0.25 0.58 0.18 
Reread  (n = 53) 43.0% 0.27 0.56 0.18 
 
 Question 3. Do strategy condition and time of judgment affect study regulation among 
middle school students?  
 Hypothesis 3. Strategy condition and time of judgment will interact in their effects on 
study regulation. 
 An ANOVA on study regulation gammas indicated that the interaction between time of 
judgment and strategy condition was not statistically significant, F(1, 78) = 0.010, p = .92. The 
main effect of time of judgment was not statistically significant, F(1, 78) = 0.013, p = .91. The 
main effect of strategy condition was not statistically significant, F(1, 78) = 2.98, p = .088. 
 Hypothesis 3 was not supported. Time of judgment and strategy condition did not interact 
in their effects on study regulation. Neither time of judgment nor strategy condition had an effect 
on study regulation. 
 
Reading Ability 
 Classification. A tertile split on the sum of comprehension test scores across the five 
reading passages was used to classify participants into ability groups. There were three levels: 
high (n = 37), medium (n = 35), and low (n = 34). Table 4 presents the means and standard 
deviations for test scores and comprehension judgments by strategy condition and ability.  
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Table 4 
Test Scores and Comprehension Judgments by Strategy Condition and Ability 
Condition Prediction Test Score Reflection Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Keyword/High (n = 18) 0.79 0.11 0.78 0.07 0.74 0.10 
Keyword/Medium (n = 19) 0.81 0.10 0.57 0.06 0.71 0.14 
Keyword/Low (n = 16) 0.72 0.16 0.37 0.07 0.58 0.16 
Reread/High (n = 19) 0.72 0.17 0.75 0.06 0.74 0.17 
Reread/Medium (n = 16) 0.78 0.11 0.58 0.04 0.74 0.10 
Reread/Low (n = 18) 0.65 0.17 0.35 0.08 0.66 0.17 
  
 An ANOVA on mean predictions did not show a significant interaction between strategy 
condition and ability, F(2, 105) = 0.22, p = .80. There was a main effect of ability on mean 
predictions, F(2, 105) = 5.22, p = .007, ηp2 = .095. Pairwise comparisons revealed that mean 
predictions differed between the low ability group and the medium ability group, M = 0.68 (SEM 
= 0.02) vs. M = 0.79 (SEM = 0.02), p = .004. There was no main effect for strategy condition on 
mean predictions, F(1, 105) = 3.59, p = .061.  
 An ANOVA on mean test scores indicated that the interaction between strategy condition 
and ability was not significant, F(2, 105) = 1.12, p = .33. There was a main effect of ability on 
mean test scores, F(2, 105) = 350.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .88. Pairwise comparisons showed that 
mean test scores differed between the low ability group and the medium ability group, M = 0.36 
(SEM = 0.01) vs. M = 0.57 (SEM = 0.01), p < .001; between the low ability and the high ability 
groups, M = 0.36 vs. M = 0.76 (SEM = 0.01), p < .001; and between the medium ability and high 
ability groups, M = 0.57 vs. M = 0.76, p < .001. There was no main effect for strategy condition 
on mean test scores, F(1, 105) = 1.83, p = .18.  
 An ANOVA on mean reflections did not show a significant interaction between strategy 
condition and ability, F(2, 105) =0.87, p = .42. There was a main effect of ability on mean 
reflections, F(2, 105) = 6.67, p =.002, ηp2 = .12. Pairwise comparisons revealed that mean 
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predictions differed between the low ability group and the medium ability group, M = 0.62 (SEM 
= 0.03) vs. M = 0.72 (SEM = 0.02), p = .015, and between the low ability group and the high 
ability group M  = 0.62 vs. M = 0.74 (SEM = 0.02), p = .004. There was no main effect for 
strategy condition on mean predictions, F(1, 105) = 1.80, p = .18.  
 Metacomprehension accuracy (signed differences). Figure 4 presents the signed 
differences between comprehension judgments and test scores by ability group (means and 
standard errors). Zero values indicate accuracy, positive values indicate overconfidence, and 
negative values indicate underconfidence. 
 
Figure 4. Signed differences by ability group. 
 
 
 Question 4. Does reading ability have an effect on whether middle school students tend 
to be underconfident, accurate, or overconfident in their comprehension judgments? 
 Hypothesis 4. Reading ability will have an effect on the accuracy of comprehension 
judgments. 
 An ANOVA on signed differences showed an effect of reading ability, F(2, 103) = 46.15, 
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overconfident than the medium ability group, M = 0.29 (SEM = 0.024) vs. M = 0.19 (SEM = 
0.024), p = .007, and the high ability group, M = 0.29 vs. M = -0.018 (SEM = 0.023), p < .001. 
The medium ability group was more overconfident than the high ability group, M = 0.29 vs. M = 
-0.018, p < .001.  
 Within the high ability group, signed differences between test scores and predictions (M 
= -0.011, SEM  = 0.023) were not significantly different from zero, t(36) < 1, p = .65, and neither 
were the signed differences between test scores and reflections (M = -0.026, SEM  = 0.024), t(36) 
= -1.11, p = .27. These results indicate that the high ability group was accurate in both 
predictions and reflections.  
 There was an effect of time of judgment, F(1, 103) = 14.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .13. 
Predictions were more overconfident than reflections, M = 0.18 (SEM = 0.015) vs. M = 0.13 
(SEM = 0.015). 
 The interaction between reading ability and time of judgment was not significant, F(2, 103) = 
1.85, p = .16.  
 Hypothesis 4 was supported. Reading ability had an effect on the accuracy of 
comprehension judgments. The low and medium ability groups were overconfident in their 
comprehension judgments, while the high ability group was accurate. Additionally, 
overconfidence was higher for predictions than for reflections.  
 Figure 5 presents the signed differences between comprehension judgments and test 
scores by reading ability and strategy condition (means and standard errors). 
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Figure 5. Signed differences by strategy condition and ability group. 
 
 
 Question 5a. Does reading ability have a moderating effect when metacomprehension 
accuracy is operationalized via signed differences? 
 Hypothesis 5a. The effects of strategy condition and time of judgment on 
metacomprehension accuracy as operationalized via signed differences will differ by ability 
group.  
 An ANOVA on signed differences showed that the three-way interaction was not 
significant, F(2, 100) = 1.69, p = .19. The two-way interaction between time of judgment and 
strategy condition was statistically significant, F(1, 100) = 14.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .13. The two-
way interaction between time of judgment and ability group was not significant, F(2, 100) = 
2.04, p = .14. The two-way interaction between strategy condition and ability group was not 
significant, F(2, 100) = 0.19, p = .83. There was a significant effect of ability group, F(2, 100) = 
44.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .47.  
 Hypothesis 5a was not supported. Time of judgment, strategy condition, and ability group 
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interaction between time of judgment and strategy condition. However, the two-way interaction 
between time of judgment and strategy condition remained significant, and there was a 
significant effect of ability group. 
 Metacomprehension accuracy (gamma correlations). Figure 6 presents the gamma 
correlations between comprehension judgments and test scores by strategy condition and ability 
group (means and standard errors). Stronger positive values for gamma indicate better 
correlation between judgments and test scores, zero values indicate a lack of a relationship, and 
negative values indicate an inverse relationship.  
 Question 5b. Does reading ability have a moderating effect when metacomprehension 
accuracy is operationalized via gamma correlations? 
 Hypothesis 5b. The effects of strategy condition and time of judgment on 
metacomprehension accuracy as operationalized via gamma correlations will differ by ability 
group.  
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 An ANOVA on gamma correlations showed that the three-way interaction was not 
significant, F(2, 90) = 0.38, p = .68. None of the two-way interactions were significant (p > .05 
in all cases). None of the main effects were significant (p > .05 in all cases). 
 Hypothesis 5b was not supported. Time of judgment, strategy condition, and ability 
group did not interact in their effects on gamma correlations. 
 Study regulation. Figure 7 presents the gamma correlations between restudy choices and 
comprehension judgments by strategy condition and ability group. A stronger negative gamma 
correlation indicates more effective study regulation in that participants chose to restudy texts 
perceived as less well learned (and did not choose to restudy texts perceived as well learned). 
 Question 6. Do the effects of strategy condition and time of judgment on study regulation 
differ by ability group? 
 Hypothesis 6. The effects of strategy condition and time of judgment on study regulation 
will differ by ability group.  
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 An ANOVA on study regulation gammas showed that the three-way interaction was not 
significant, F(2, 74) = 2.70, p = .074. None of the two-way interactions were significant (p > .05 
in all cases). None of the main effects were significant (p > .05 in all cases). 
 Hypothesis 6 was not supported. Time of judgment, strategy condition, and ability group 





 Experiment 1 showed that middle school students tend to be inaccurate in their judgments 
of comprehension. In general, students in the study were overconfident about their 
comprehension. Time of judgment and reading ability were found to have effects on the degree 
of overconfidence. Predictions were more overconfident than reflections, and lower reading 
ability was linked to higher overconfidence. Participants who were classified as having high 
reading ability were actually quite accurate in judging their own comprehension. 
 Strategy condition and time of judgment interacted in their effects on metacomprehension 
accuracy as operationalized via signed differences. For the keyword group, there was a bigger 
difference between predictions and test scores than between reflections and test scores, 
indicating that predictions were more accurate than were reflections. For the reread group, there 
was no difference due to time of judgment; participants were equally overconfident in their 
reflections as in their predictions. 
 However, when metacomprehension accuracy was operationalized using gamma 
correlations, time of judgment and strategy condition did not interact, and neither time of 
judgment nor strategy condition had an effect on its own. There was no effect of reading ability. 
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A similar pattern of results was obtained for study regulation, which was also operationalized 
using gamma correlations. 
 The different patterns of results obtained using the two measures of metacomprehension 
accuracy are surprising. Additional research is needed to determine why this may be. One 
possibility is that signed differences and gamma correlations measure different aspects of 
metacomprehension. A second possibility is that gamma correlations are an inappropriate 
measure of metacomprehension accuracy in the context of the current experimental paradigm. 
The latter explanation is supported by the number of cases in which gamma could not be 
computed (i.e., the instances in which participants made the same rating or the same restudy 
choice for all passages) and also by the large standard errors for the gammas obtained in this 
study. 
 Surprisingly, although keyword generation led to an increase in metacomprehension 
accuracy from pretest to posttest, it did not appear to have an effect on actual comprehension. 
Scores on the comprehension test did not differ across the keyword and reread groups. These 
results suggest that while generating keywords may have helped participants recognize that their 






 The current research compared the effects of generating keywords and rereading text on 
metacomprehension accuracy and study regulation. The following hypotheses were tested 
(supported hypotheses appear in bolded font): 
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1. Middle school students will be overconfident in their judgments of comprehension.  
2. Strategy condition and time of judgment will interact in their effects on 
metacomprehension accuracy.3  
3. Strategy condition and time of judgment will interact in their effects on study 
regulation.  
4. Reading ability will have an effect on the accuracy of comprehension judgments.  
5. The effects of strategy condition and time of judgment on metacomprehension accuracy 
will differ by ability group.  
6. The effects of strategy condition and time of judgment on study regulation will differ by 
ability group.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Hypothesis 2 was supported when metacomprehension accuracy was operationalized via signed 
differences, but it was not supported when gamma correlations were used. 
	   	  




IMPROVING THE UTILITY OF THE STUDY STRATEGIES (EXPERIMENT 2) 
 
 
 Experiment 1 showed that middle school students tend to be overconfident in their 
judgments of their own comprehension, and that the degree of overconfidence depends on what 
type of study strategy students used and also on when they made the comprehension judgment. 
Students who generated keywords made post-test reflections that were significantly less 
overconfident than were their pre-test predictions, while students who reread text remained as 
overconfident in their reflections as in their predictions. Surprisingly, although the two groups 
differed on metacomprehension, there was no difference in actual comprehension: mean test 
score was 58 percent for the keyword group and 56 percent for the reread group. That test scores 
were so low in both groups suggests that generating keywords and rereading text may be equally 
ineffective as comprehension strategies. Therefore, a goal of Experiment 2 was to embed the 
comparison of generating keywords and rereading text within a context involving an effective 
comprehension strategy in order to determine the effects on metacomprehension. 
 Dunlosky, Rawson, Marsh, Nathan, and Willingham (2013) recently reviewed and 
evaluated ten study strategies that have been the focus of extensive research by cognitive and 
educational psychologists. Each strategy was rated in terms of the empirical evidence supporting 
its effectiveness and of the practical considerations surrounding its implementation. A strategy 
was classified as having high utility if it was found to have robust and generalizable effects on 
learning and if it was determined to be easy to use and also likely to be used by students. 
Keywords were included among the reviewed strategies, but in the sense of associating keywords 
with mental imagery in order to learn vocabulary words or verbal materials and not as a 
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comprehension strategy. Rereading– restudying text again after an initial reading was found to be 
one of the strategies most frequently used by students (Dunlosky et al., 2013; Karpicke, Butler, 
& Roediger, 2009). However, based on their review of the empirical literature, Dunlosky and his 
colleagues (2013) classified both keywords and rereading as being of low utility.  
 In contrast, one of the study strategies rated as having high utility is practice testing, 
which Dunlosky and his colleagues (2013) define as any form of low- or no-stakes testing that 
students can complete on their own over to-be-learned material. Examples of practice testing 
include using flashcards to practice recall of target material, completing practice problems or 
questions after reading, and completing practice quizzes or practice tests accompanying 
textbooks (Dunlosky et al., 2013). In one of the reviewed studies, Butler (2010) had students 
read expository texts and then either reread the texts or take practice tests; performance on new 
test questions given one week later was higher following practice testing than following 
rereading. In Experiment 2, practice test questions were included in the experimental procedure 
in an attempt to improve comprehension as well as metacomprehension. All participants 
answered two practice test questions about each passage before either generating keywords or 
rereading passages.  
 In addition to examining the effects of study strategy, Experiment 2 also investigated the 
effects of a second factor: peer collaboration. Language arts classrooms are oftentimes highly 
social in nature, as teachers integrate collaboration and discussion with instruction in an attempt 
to stimulate and support deep comprehension and critical thinking (Cazden & Beck, 2003). 
Additionally, research on anchoring and estimation shows that college students can use 
information about peer performance as a basis for their judgments about themselves (Zhao & 
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Linderholm, 2011). Therefore, a second goal of Experiment 2 was to determine whether peer 
collaboration has an effect on either comprehension or metacomprehension. 
 
Questions and Hypotheses 
 
 
 The purpose of Experiment 2 was to examine the effects of keyword generation on 
metacomprehension accuracy and study regulation in a context that was more similar to an 
authentic school situation. The comparison of keyword generation to rereading text was situated 
within a new study context incorporating practice testing. In addition, a new variable, peer 
collaboration, was introduced. The following questions were addressed: 
7. Do middle school students tend to be accurate when making judgments about their own 
comprehension? If they are inaccurate, do they tend to be underconfident or 
overconfident? 
8. Do strategy condition, collaboration condition, and time of judgment affect whether 
middle school students are underconfident, accurate, or overconfident in their 
comprehension judgments?  
a. Do strategy condition, collaboration condition, and time of judgment affect 
metacomprehension accuracy as operationalized via signed differences? 
b. Do strategy condition, collaboration condition, and time of judgment affect 
metacomprehension accuracy as operationalized via gamma correlations? 
9. Do strategy condition, collaboration condition, and time of judgment affect study 
regulation among middle school students?  
Based on a review of the literature on metacomprehension accuracy and on the results of 
Experiment 1, the following hypotheses were expected for Experiment 2: 
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7. Middle school students will be overconfident in their judgments of comprehension. 
As was found in Experiment 1, it is expected that participants will be overconfident in 
their judgments.  
8. Strategy condition, collaboration condition, and time of judgment will interact in 
their effects on metacomprehension accuracy. Zhao and Linderholm (2011) found 
that college students can use peer performance as a basis for their judgments about 
themselves. Experiment 1 showed that generating keywords led to an increase in 
metacomprehension accuracy from pre-test to post-test. Therefore, it is expected that 
the combination of peer collaboration and keyword generation will lead to more 
accurate post-test reflections.  
9. Strategy condition, collaboration condition, and time of judgment will interact in 
their effects on study regulation. Increasing the accuracy of a learner’s comprehension 
judgments will enable that learner to make more effective decisions about whether or 







 A total of 190 seventh grade students (90 male and 100 female) from four 
demographically similar public schools in New York City participated in Experiment 2. (One of 
the four schools had previously participated in Experiment 1, but no student who participated in 
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 A 2 x 2 factorial design was used. Participants were randomly assigned to the following 
four conditions: individual/keyword (n = 43), collaborate/keyword (n = 54), individual/reread (n 




 Participants completed the following steps in order in a single 80-minute-long 
experimental session: (1) they read five passages, (2) they answered practice test questions about 
the passages, (3) they either generated keywords about the passages or reread the passages, (4) 
they made pre-test predictions, (5) they answered test questions about the passages, (6) they 
made post-test reflections, and (7) they chose passages for restudy.  
 Participants in the two individual conditions completed all of the above steps 
independently. Participants in the collaborative conditions worked with a partner on the second 
and third steps. Each pair worked together to discuss the practice test questions, and pairs in the 
keyword condition also worked together to generate a list of five keywords about the gist of each 
passage. They completed the other five steps on their own. The steps were administered by the 




 The reading passages, test questions, comprehension judgment prompts, and study 
regulation prompts used in Experiment 1 were used again in Experiment 2. 
 Practice test questions. For each passage, two free-response practice test questions were 
created that assessed comprehension of the causal relationships in the text. The practice test 
questions were designed to be congruent with the cause-effect structure of the passages, and 
were modeled after the ones used by Williams and her colleagues in their studies on cause-effect 
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text structure (e.g., Williams et al., 2009; Williams et al., 2014). For the passage entitled, “The 
Fight or Flight Response,” the practice test questions were: (1) Why is the endocrine system 
called the “fight or flight response”? and (2) What happens when adrenaline is released into the 




 There were two dependent measures: (1) metacomprehension accuracy and (2) study 
regulation. Metacomprehension accuracy was operationalized in two different ways: (1a) as the 
signed differences between comprehension judgments and test scores, and (1b) as the gamma 
correlations between comprehension judgments and test scores. Study regulation was 





 The data from Experiment 2 were analyzed using a mixed 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA. Strategy 
condition was treated as a between-subjects variable (2 levels: keyword and reread). 
Collaboration condition was treated as a between-subjects variable (2 levels: individual and 






 An exploratory analysis on comprehension judgments and test scores revealed one 
extreme outlier in the data. This was assessed by inspection of a boxplot for values that were 
more than 3 box-lengths from the edge of the box. The outlier was excluded from the analyses 
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that follow, resulting in a total sample size of N = 189. (The outlier was in the 
keyword/collaborate condition.) Table 5 presents the characteristics of the participants by 
strategy condition and collaboration condition. 
 Chi-square tests were conducted to detect differences in participant characteristics across 
the experimental conditions. Following random assignment, there were no significant differences 
in assignment to the four conditions for age, χ2(6, N = 189) = 2.09, p = .91, gender, χ2(3, N = 
189) = 1.15, p = .77, or for school, χ2(9, N = 189) = 13.57, p = .14. 
 
Table 5 




(n = 43) 
Keyword/ 
Collaborate 
(n = 53) 
Reread/ 
Individual 
(n = 43) 
Reread/ 
Collaborate 
(n = 50) 
School A4 16 8 23 14 
 D 5 7 8 10 
 E 19 22 22 22 
 F 3 6 0 4 
Age 11 years 9 11 10 7 
 12 years 30 38 31 39 
 13 years 4 4 2 4 
Gender Male 21 22 22 25 
 Female 22 31 21 25 
 
 Levene’s tests revealed that the assumption of homogeneity of variances held for mean 
prediction (p = .58), mean test score (p = .28), and mean reflection (p = .85). Shapiro-Wilk’s 
tests were used to determine whether the assumption of normality held. For mean predictions, the 
assumption of normality held for the keyword/individual group (p = .084), the reread/individual 
group (p = .44), and the reread/collaborate group (p = .34), but was violated for the 
keyword/collaborate group (p = .004). For mean test scores, the assumption of normality held for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 School A previously participated in Experiment 1 during the previous school year. No student who 
participated in Experiment 1 also participated in Experiment 2. 
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the keyword/individual group (p = .12), the reread/individual group (p = .59), and the 
keyword/collaborate group (p = .38), but was violated for the reread/collaborate group (p = 
.043). For mean reflections, the assumption of normality held for the keyword/collaborate group 
(p = .13), but was violated for the keyword/individual group (p = .028), the reread/individual 
group (p = .041), and the reread/collaborate group (p = .014). Since ANOVA has been found to 
be robust to violations of normality (e.g., Feir-Walsh & Toothaker, 1974), we chose to proceed 
with the analyses with caution.  




Test Scores and Comprehension Judgments by Strategy and Collaboration Condition  
Condition Prediction Test Score Reflection Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
KW/IND (n = 43) 0.69 0.16 0.52 0.19 0.63 0.17 
KW/COL (n = 53) 0.72 0.14 0.55 0.16 0.68 0.15 
RR/IND (n = 43) 0.71 0.15 0.59 0.17 0.67 0.16 
RR/COL (n = 50) 0.75 0.14 0.55 0.17 0.71 0.16 
 
 An ANOVA on mean predictions showed no interaction between strategy condition and 
collaboration condition, F(1, 188) < 1, p = .95, and no main effects of strategy, F(1, 188) = 1.28, 
p = .26, or collaboration, F(1, 188) = 2.48, p = .12. An ANOVA on mean test scores showed no 
interaction between strategy condition and collaboration condition, F(1, 188) = 2.22, p = .14, and 
no main effects of strategy, F(1, 188) = 1.97, p = .16, or collaboration, F(1, 188) < 1, p = .88.  
An ANOVA on mean reflections showed no interaction between strategy condition and 
collaboration condition, F(1, 188) < 1, p = .82, and no main effects of strategy, F(1, 188) = 2.44, 
p = .12, or collaboration, F(1, 188) = 3.39, p = .07. 
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Metacomprehension Accuracy 
 Signed differences. Group means of the intra-individual signed differences between 
comprehension judgments (scored as a proportion out of 6 possible points) and test scores 
(scored as a proportion out of 6 possible points) across the five passages were computed. The 
signed differences are presented in Figure 8. Zero values indicate accuracy, positive values 
indicate overconfidence, and negative values indicate underconfidence.  
 
Figure 8. Signed differences between comprehension judgments and test scores. 
 
 Question 7. Do middle school students tend to be accurate when making judgments about 
their own comprehension? If they are inaccurate, do they tend to be underconfident or 
overconfident? 
 Hypothesis 7. Middle school students will be overconfident in their judgments of 
comprehension. 
 As shown in Figure 8, all of the signed differences were positive, indicating that 
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 Hypothesis 7 was supported. All of the signed differences were positive, showing that 
students were overconfident in their judgments of comprehension.  
 Question 8a. Do strategy condition, collaboration condition, and time of judgment affect 
metacomprehension accuracy as operationalized via signed differences? 
 Hypothesis 8a. Strategy condition, collaboration condition, and time of judgment will 
interact in their effects on metacomprehension accuracy as operationalized via signed 
differences. 
 An ANOVA on signed differences showed that the three-way interaction was not 
significant, F(1, 185) < 1, p = .71. The two-way interaction between time of judgment and 
strategy condition was not significant, F(1, 185) < 1, p = .47. The two-way interaction between 
time of judgment and collaboration condition was not significant, F(1, 185) < 1, p = .58. The 
two-way interaction between collaboration condition and strategy condition was not significant, 
F(1, 185) = 2.41, p = .12. The main effect of strategy condition was not significant, F(1, 185) < 
1, p = .85.  
 There was a main effect for time of judgment, F(1, 185) = 26.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .127. 
Post hoc tests showed that there was a bigger difference between predictions and test scores than 
between reflections at test scores, M = 0.17 (SEM = 0.013) vs. M = 0.12 (SEM = 0.012); in other 
words, overconfidence was greater for predictions than for reflections. 
 The main effect of collaboration condition approached significance, F(1, 185) = 3.51, p = 
.062, ηp2 = .019. Therefore, post hoc tests were conducted. Results showed that overconfidence 
was higher in the collaborative group than in the individual group, M = 0.16 (SEM = 0.015) vs. 
M = 0.12 (SEM = 0.017). Within the reread group, overconfidence was higher in the 
collaborative group than in the individual group, M = 0.18 (SEM = 0.021) vs. M = 0.10 (SEM = 
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0.023), F(1, 91) = 6.29, p = .014, ηp2 = .065. Within the keyword group, the collaborative and 
individual groups did not differ in overconfidence, F(1, 94) < 1, p = .83. 
 Hypothesis 8a was not supported. Strategy condition, collaboration condition, and time of 
judgment did not interact in their effects on metacomprehension accuracy. None of the two-way 
interactions were statistically significant. There was a main effect of time of judgment, such that 
predictions were more overconfident– or less accurate– than reflections. Overconfidence was 
higher among participants who collaborated than among those who worked individually, and the 
effect of collaboration on overconfidence was especially pronounced within the reread group. 
 Gamma correlations. Group means of the intra-individual gamma correlations between 
comprehension judgments and test scores across the five passages were computed. Figure 9 
presents the gamma correlations. 
  
 Figure 9. Gamma correlations between comprehension judgments and test scores. 
  
 Gammas could not be computed in instances where participants made the same judgment 
for all five passages. The analysis was completed with n = 40 students (out of 43) in the 
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43) in the individual/reread group, and n = 43 (out of 43) in the collaborate/reread group. The 
gamma correlations were small, indicating that comprehension judgments were weakly related to 
test scores. Additionally, relative to the gammas, the standard errors were quite large. 
 Question 8b: Do strategy condition, collaboration condition, and time of judgment 
interact when metacomprehension accuracy is operationalized via gamma correlations? 
 Hypothesis 8b: Strategy condition, collaboration condition, and time of judgment will 
interact in their effects on metacomprehension accuracy as operationalized via gamma 
correlations. 
 An ANOVA on gamma correlations showed that the three-way interaction was not 
significant, F(1, 161) < 1, p = .45. None of the two-way interactions were significant (p > .05 in 
all cases). None of the main effects were significant (p > .05 in all cases). 
 Hypothesis 8b was not supported. Strategy condition, collaboration condition, and time of 
judgment did not interact in their effects on metacomprehension accuracy. None of the two-way 
interactions were significant, and none of the main effects were significant. 
 
Study Regulation 
 Study regulation was operationalized as the mean of the intra-individual gamma 
correlations between comprehension judgments (which ranged from 0 to 6) and restudy choices 
(which were scored as either 0 or 1, with 1 indicating that a text was selected for restudy and 0 
indicating that it was not). A stronger negative correlation indicates more effective study 
regulation in that participants chose to restudy texts perceived as less well learned (and did not 
choose to restudy texts perceived as well learned).  
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 Gammas could not be computed in instances where participants made the same restudy 
choice for all five passages. The analysis was completed with n = 33 students (out of 43) in the 
individual/keyword group, n = 40 (out of 53) in the collaborate/keyword group, n = 36 (out of 
43) in the individual/reread group, and n = 36 (out of 50) in the collaborate/reread group.. Figure 
10 illustrates the study regulation gammas. In general, the gammas were small and negative, 
indicating that participants based their study choices on their comprehension judgments, 
although the relationship was weak. Standard errors were large. 
 
 
Figure 10. Study regulation gammas by strategy and collaboration condition. 
 
 Question 9: Do strategy condition, collaboration condition, and time of judgment interact 
in their effects on study regulation? 
 Hypothesis 9: Strategy condition, collaboration condition, and time of judgment will 
interact in their effects on study regulation.  
 An ANOVA on study regulation showed that the three-way interaction was not 
significant, F(1, 136) < 1, p = .68. None of the two-way interactions were significant (p > .05 in 
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 Hypothesis 9 was not supported. Time of judgment, strategy condition, and collaboration 
condition did not interact in their effects on study regulation. None of the two-way interactions 





 As in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 showed that middle school students tend to be 
overconfident when making judgments about their own comprehension. Time of judgment was 
again found to have an effect on the degree of overconfidence, such that predictions were more 
overconfident than predictions.  
 Peer collaboration also had an effect on metacomprehension accuracy; the effect, 
however, was not quite statistically significant. Participants who collaborated with a peer were 
more overconfident than participants who worked alone. This finding is surprising, as it was 
hypothesized that collaborating with a peer would provide an anchor for the judgments an 
individual made about him or herself and would therefore lead to increased metacomprehension 
accuracy. Quite the contrary, peer collaboration appeared to inflate participants’ confidence 
about how well they had comprehended what they read.  
 Interestingly, the effect of collaboration on overconfidence was especially pronounced 
within the reread group. Within the keyword group, participants who collaborated and 
participants who worked alone did not differ in overconfidence. Within the reread group, 
however, participants who collaborated were significantly more overconfident than those who 
worked alone. One possible explanation for this finding is that peer collaboration may be a 
source of distraction or confusion that prevents students from achieving the level of focused 
attention that is necessary to make an accurate metacognitive judgment. 
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 The addition of practice test questions appeared to lead to less overconfidence than was 
observed in Experiment 1. For three out of the four groups in the current study, signed 
differences were lower than those from Experiment 2; the exception was the collaborate/reread 
group. Interestingly, as in Experiment 1, scores on the comprehension test were low, ranging 
from 0.52 to 0.59 (scores were 0.58 and 0.56 in Experiment 1). It appears that adding practice 
test questions was insufficient to boost comprehension. 
 Again, as was found in Experiment 1, the obtained gamma correlations for both 
metacomprehension accuracy and study regulation were small, especially relative to the standard 
errors. Together, the results of the two experiments suggest that gamma correlations may not be 
the most appropriate or powerful statistic given the design of the study and its materials. It bears 
noting that, in the current study, 11 students were excluded from the analysis on 
metacomprehension accuracy gammas, and 44 were excluded from the analysis on study 





 The current research examined the effects of keyword generation and peer collaboration 
on metacomprehension accuracy and study regulation. The following hypotheses were tested 
(supported hypotheses appear in bolded font): 
7. Middle school students will be overconfident in their judgments of comprehension.  
8. Strategy condition, collaboration condition, and time of judgment will interact in their 
effects on metacomprehension accuracy.  
9. Strategy condition, collaboration condition, and time of judgment will interact in their 
effects on study regulation. 
  
 






 The current research explored whether middle school students are able to make accurate 
comprehension judgments and whether they can apply those judgments to make effective study 
choices. Experiment 1 involved 109 seventh graders from New York City public schools and 
compared the effects of generating keywords and rereading text on metacomprehension accuracy 
and study regulation. Experiment 2 involved 190 seventh graders and asked whether the effect of 
keyword generation on metacomprehension accuracy and study regulation would continue to 
hold in the presence of practice testing and peer collaboration. 
 
Summary of the Findings 
 
 The results of Experiment 1 showed that middle school students tend to be overconfident 
in their judgments of their own comprehension. Overconfidence was greater for pre-test 
predictions than for post-test reflections, and it was also greater for students with lower reading 
ability. Generating keywords caused participants to become significantly less overconfident– or 
more accurate– from pre-test to post-test in their comprehension judgments but it did not actually 
boost comprehension scores; in other words, generating keywords helped participants know that 
they did not know, but it did not, however, help them know more.  
 Similarly, participants in Experiment 2 were also overconfident in judging their own 
comprehension. Again, there was an effect for time of judgment, such that predictions were more 
overconfident than were reflections. Surprisingly, peer collaboration was found to lead to greater 
overconfidence in comprehension judgments. Participants who collaborated with a peer were 
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more overconfident than participants who worked alone. Experiment 2 showed that in the 
presence of practice testing and peer collaboration, the interactive effect of keyword generation 
and time of judgment was minimized. Within the keyword group, participants who collaborated 
and participants who worked alone did not differ in overconfidence. Within the reread group, 






 The finding that generating keywords led participants to become significantly less 
overconfident– or more accurate– from pre-test to post-test has important practical implications. 
It bears noting that the actual scores on the comprehension tests did not differ across groups. In 
Experiment 1, the mean percentage score across the five tests was 58% for the keyword group 
and 56% for the reread group. The discrepancy between comprehension judgments and test 
scores did, however, differ across groups and over time. For the keyword group, the gap between 
perceived and actual comprehension narrowed from pre-test to post-test; for the reread group, 
there was no change.  
 These data indicate that keyword generation has an effect on metacomprehension but not 
on comprehension. Generating keywords helped participants know that they did not know; it did 
not, however, help them know more. These results suggest that keyword generation may be of 
low utility as a comprehension or study strategy. Instead, the benefit may be diagnostic in nature, 
in that the ability to generate keywords as well as the inability to do so are taken into account 
when making comprehension judgments. The ability to make accurate judgments is especially 
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important during self-regulated study, when a learner must make decisions about when to start, 
stop, and continue studying.  
 Based on the results of Experiments 1 and 2, there is reason to believe that the effect of 
keyword generation may be analogous to that of practice testing. Used alone, keyword 
generation led to better metacomprehension accuracy than did rereading text (Experiment 1); 
when participants in both groups were given practice test questions to answer before generating 
keywords or rereading text, there was no difference in metacomprehension accuracy (Experiment 
2). Generating keywords and practice testing are strategies that require a learner to retrieve and 
recall previously read information. Both strategies are generally used after reading but before 
testing, and both have the potential to inform and direct further study. One answer to the question 
of how and when keyword generation should be used is that it can be applied in lieu of or in 
addition to practice testing.  
 When metacomprehension accuracy was operationalized via gamma correlations, the 
keyword and reread groups did not differ. The gamma correlations obtained in Experiments 1 
and 2 were generally low, and were actually higher (though not significantly so) in the reread 
group than in the keyword. These results are surprising, given the findings of other studies in the 
literature and the results obtained here using measures of confidence. One explanation for this 
involves the nature of gamma. Some researchers have argued that gamma is an unreliable and 
unstable measure of metacomprehension accuracy (e.g., Kelemen, Frost, & Weaver, 2000; 
Thompson & Mason, 1996). Alternatively, it may be that gamma correlations and signed 
differences measure different aspects of metacomprehension. Maki, Shields, Wheeler, and 
Zacchilli (2005) found that gamma correlations and signed differences were differently affected 
by text difficulty and verbal ability and were also uncorrelated.  
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 The results of the current research provide support for the latter explanation. Gamma 
correlations measure two variables are monotonically associated, and are useful for assessing the 
consistency of judgments across a set of items (Maki, 1998a; Schraw, 2009). Signed differences 
indicate the degree to which individuals are under- or over-confident, and are useful for 
assessing the precision of judgments. If the measures assess different aspects of 
metacomprehension, then the finding that they are differently affected by experimental 
manipulations need not indicate that either measure is unreliable or unstable. 
 In general, study regulation gammas were higher for the reread group than the keyword 
group, indicating that participants in this group made restudy choices that were more strongly 
associated with their comprehension judgments. However, it is important to note that the 
comprehension judgments upon which the study choices were based were themselves 
inaccurate– or overconfident– for this group. In other words, participants who reread texts were 
more likely to rate their comprehension highly and less likely to choose to restudy than 
participants who generated keywords. To wit, an examination of the data from Experiment 1 
shows that 47% of participants in the keyword group chose to restudy, compared to only 42% of 
participants in the reread group (although this difference is not significant).  
 The addition of practice testing in Experiment 2 led to a different pattern of results than 
was observed in Experiment 1. In the presence of practice test questions, keyword generation did 
not lead to better metacomprehension accuracy than did rereading text. Interestingly, the data 
indicate that within the reread condition, overconfidence was actually higher (though not 
significantly so) among participants who worked with a partner than among participants who 
worked individually; there was no difference within the keyword condition. In other words, 
answering practice questions individually before rereading led to better accuracy than did 
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discussing practice questions with a partner before rereading. Peer collaboration did not appear 
to improve metacomprehension accuracy. On the contrary, collaborating may have actually had 





 The design of the current research did not include an experimental manipulation of 
practice testing. Consequently, it cannot be known for certain that the different results obtained 
in Experiments 1 and 2 are due to the inclusion of practice testing in Experiment 2. Additional 
research is needed to determine if the effects of keyword generation and peer collaboration 
together are the same in the presence of practice testing and also in the absence of practice 
testing.  
 Another area for further investigation involves keyword quality. The current research did 
not examine the quality of the keywords that were generated, and it did not analyze the effect of 
keyword quality on metacomprehension accuracy. It is possible that higher keyword quality 
would be associated with higher metacomprehension accuracy and perhaps higher 
comprehension scores as well. It is also possible that given adequate training, students can learn 
to generate keywords in a way that does lead to increased comprehension.  
 A third area for additional study involves pair type. In Experiment 2, participants in the 
collaborative condition were randomly paired with a partner without consideration of gender or 
ability. It is possible that whether pairs are homogenous or heterogeneous in terms of these 
variables might have an effect on metacomprehension accuracy. Additionally, future work could 
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Word count 327 322 418 294 359 
Reading levela 7.5 8.2 6.4 7.2 6.7 
Narrativity 0.14 0.15 0.28 0.14 0.25 
Syntactic simplicity 0.97 0.87 0.44 0.81 0.93 
Word concreteness 0.89 0.75 0.96 0.88 0.95 
Referential cohesion 0.35 0.53 0.99 0.77 0.61 
Deep cohesion 0.99 0.41 0.18 0.38 0.91 
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Causes of Extinction  
 
Extinction is the disappearance of a species.  Natural events, such as a volcanic eruption, 
can cause extinction.  Human activities can also cause extinction through habitat destruction, 
hunting, pollution, and introduction of new species.   
 Most extinction is from habitat destruction— the loss of a natural habitat.  This can occur 
when forests are chopped down.  Forests get chopped down to build towns or create grazing 
land.  Plowing grasslands or filling in wetlands also changes the area.  Some species may be 
unable to survive these changes.   
 Habitat fragmentation is when larger habitats are broken into smaller, isolated pieces.  
For example, building a road through a forest disrupts habitats.  Wind is likely to damage the 
exposed trees.  Plants may be unable to spread their seeds.  Habitat fragmentation is also harmful 
to large mammals.  These animals often need large areas of land to find enough food to live.  A 
small area may not have enough food.  They may also be hurt trying to cross to another area. 
 Poaching is the illegal killing or taking of wildlife from their habitats.  Hunters hunt 
many animals for their skin, fur, teeth, horns, or claws.  Hunters sell the animals they kill.  The 
animal parts are used for making things such as medicines, jewelry, and clothing.  People also 
illegally take animals from their habitats to sell them as exotic pets.  Tropical fish, tortoises, and 
parrots are popular pets, making them valuable to poachers.  Endangered plants are sometimes 
illegally dug up and sold as houseplants or medicines.   
 Pollutants that cause pollution also hurt some species.  Animals may drink water or 
breathe air with pollutants.  Pollutants may also be in the soil which will then go into plants.  
These pollutants increase through the food chain.  For example, a small amount of pollutants 
may be in each blade of grass, but a grazing cow that eats a lot of grass will contain a lot of those 
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Cellular Respiration 
 
You’ve been hiking all morning, and you are hungry. You get out a sandwich you packed 
and begin munching. Food supplies your body with glucose, an energy-rich sugar. Respiration is 
the process by which cells obtain energy from glucose. During cellular respiration, cells break 
down simple food molecules such as glucose and release the energy they contain. Most of the 
energy used by the cells in your body is provided by cellular respiration. 
Energy stored in cells is something like money in a savings account. During 
photosynthesis, plants capture energy from sunlight and ‘‘save’’ it in the form of carbohydrates, 
including sugars and starches. When you eat, you add to your body’s energy savings account. 
When cells need energy, they ‘‘withdraw’’ it by breaking down the carbohydrates in the process 
of respiration. 
Cellular respiration is a two-stage process. The first stage takes place in the cytoplasm of 
the organism’s cells. There, molecules of glucose are broken down into smaller molecules. 
Oxygen is not involved, and only a small amount of energy is released. 
The second stage of cellular respiration takes place in the mitochondria. There, the small 
molecules are broken down into even smaller molecules. These chemical reactions require 
oxygen, and they release a great deal of energy. This is why the mitochondria are sometimes 
called the ‘‘powerhouses’’ of the cell. 
Energy is released as a product in both stages of respiration. This is transferred to other 
molecules, which then carry the energy where it is needed for the activities of the cell. The rest 
of the energy is released as heat. Two other products of cellular respiration are carbon dioxide 
and water. These products diffuse out of the cell. In most animals, the carbon dioxide and some 
water leave the body during exhalation or breathing out. When you breathe in, you take in 
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The Circulatory System 
 
Your body’s circulatory system - your heart, lungs, blood vessels, and blood - helps to 
keep you alive.  It carries needed things to cells and carries waste away from cells.  Your blood 
also has cells that fight disease.  
Your heart has four chambers and works at the center of the system, pushing blood 
through two different loops through different parts of your body.  Your heart has two sides, and 
each side has an upper chamber, the atrium, and a lower chamber, the ventricle. When blood 
from the body fills up the right top part of the heart, or right atrium, it has a little oxygen but a lot 
of carbon dioxide.  This oxygen-poor blood is dark red.  The blood then flows from the right 
atrium into the right ventricle.  The right ventricle pumps the oxygen-poor blood into the arteries 
that go to the lungs.  
As blood goes through the lungs, large blood vessels break into smaller ones.  Blood goes 
through tiny vessels, or capillaries, that meet up with the air that comes into the lungs.  The air in 
the lungs has more oxygen than the blood in the capillaries, so oxygen moves from the air into 
the blood.  Because the blood has more carbon dioxide then the air in the lungs, carbon dioxide 
moves in the opposite direction – from the blood into the air. This oxygen-rich blood, which is 
bright red, goes into the left side of the heart to be pumped through the second loop.  
The second loop begins with the left atrium that is filled with oxygen-rich blood from the 
lungs.  The blood moves into the left ventricle.  From the left ventricle, the oxygen-rich blood is 
pumped into the largest artery in the body—the aorta. 
After passing through arteries, blood goes through tiny capillaries in different parts of 
your body, including your brain, liver, and legs.  These vessels meet up with body cells.  Oxygen 
moves out of the blood and into the body cells.  At the same time, carbon dioxide moves from 
the blood cells and into the blood.  This blood, which is low in oxygen, then moves back to the 
right atrium of the heart through veins, completing the second loop.  Blood only moves in one 
direction, and the whole trip through your body takes less than one minute.  When the muscles in 
your body really need oxygen, the whole process speeds up. Your heart beats faster, and the 
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Digestion 
 
When you chew, you start the mechanical digestion of food. Your teeth break up the food 
into small pieces.  At the same time, your body makes saliva that contains enzymes which break 
the food’s complex starch molecules into simpler ones. This is called chemical digestion. When 
you swallow, your tongue pushes the food down your throat, where it travels down to your 
stomach.   
Your stomach is a J-shaped, muscular pouch in your abdomen.  Most mechanical 
digestion happens in the stomach. Three strong layers of muscle contract to make a stirring 
motion.  This action mixes the food with digestive fluids made by cells in the stomach.   
Chemical digestion also happens as the food mixes with digestive fluid.  Digestive fluid 
has the enzyme pepsin, which digests the proteins in your food, breaking them down into short 
chains of amino acids.  Digestive juice also has hydrochloric acid.  Without this acid, your 
stomach would not work well.  Pepsin works best in hydrochloric acid.   
A few hours after you eat, the stomach completes mechanical digestion of the food.  By 
that time, most of the proteins have turned into shorter chains of amino acids.  The food, now a 
thick liquid, is sent to the small intestine where most chemical digestion takes place.  The small 
intestine is where fats are broken down by the liver and pancreas, which also help to break down 
any remaining starches and proteins.   Once broken down, these molecules are absorbed into the 
body through the wall of the small intestine.  
The digestive fluids produced by the pancreas and other organs do not break down fiber.  
The fiber remains undigested and it, along with water, goes to the large intestine.  In the large 
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The Fight or Flight Response 
 
You’re in the park on a hot afternoon.  Without warning, dark clouds form.  Suddenly, 
there’s a flash of lightning.  You hear loud thunder. Someone screams, you jump and everyone 
runs for cover.  Your heart is pounding.  Your body’s reaction to the sudden storm is caused by 
your endocrine system. 
The endocrine system produces chemicals that control many of the body’s daily 
activities. The endocrine system is made up of glands.  A gland is an organ that makes or 
releases a chemical.  Some glands, like the ones that make saliva and sweat, release their 
chemicals into tiny tubes called ducts.  The ducts deliver the chemicals to a specific place within 
the body or to the skin’s surface.  However, endocrine glands make and release their chemical 
products into the bloodstream.  This chemical product is called a hormone.  Blood carries 
hormones everywhere in the body.  A hormone does not interact with all organs in the body.  It 
interacts with only certain cells that recognize the hormone’s chemical structure.  These are 
called target cells.  Hormones will travel through the bloodstream until they find target cells that 
they fit. Target cells then respond by turning on, turning off, speeding up, or slowing down the 
activities of different organs and tissues.  Hormones can control activities in tissues and organs 
that are far away from the glands that made them.  
The endocrine system controls the body’s response to an exciting situation and hormones 
are released by nerve impulses from the brain.  For example, when a person sees something that 
is scary, the brain sends a message to a specific endocrine gland, the adrenal gland.  That gland 
releases the hormone adrenaline into the bloodstream.  The target cells for adrenaline are in your 
heart and lungs. These target cells then respond to adrenaline by speeding up the heart and lungs. 
It also releases sugars in your muscles to give you energy in case you need to either “fight” or 
run away from a situation (“flight”).  That is why this has been called the fight-or-flight 



















Causes of Extinction 
 
1.  Which of the following would best deter poaching?  
a.    Legalizing hunting of endangered or exotic animals 
b.    Relocating endangered or exotic animals to new locations 
           c.    Introducing natural predators of endangered or exotic animals 
d.    Decreasing demand for a particular animal or animal product 
 
2.   Most extinction results from: 
a. Habitat destruction   




3.   Which of the following would best minimize the harm done by habitat fragmentation? 
a.    Legalizing the hunting of the constricted large mammals  
b.    Expanding the territory of large mammals in adjacent areas  
c.    Introducing natural predators of the large mammals 
         d.    Perform habitat fragmentation slowly so that animals can adjust 
 
4.   Poaching involves either the illegal killing or _________ of wildlife: 
   a.  Integration 
   b.  Introduction 
   c.  Production 
 d.  Removal 
 
5. Which of the following causes of extinction are humans most responsible for? 
a.    Poaching animals 
b.    Causing natural disasters 
           c.    Introducing exotic plants 
d.    Birth defects in animal parents 
 
6.   Chopping down a forest is an example of: 
a.  Extinction through natural disasters 
   b.  Extinction through pollution 
   c.  Extinction through habitat fragmentation 
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Cellular Respiration 
 
1.  When you breathe into your hand and your palm becomes moist, this is caused by: 
a.    The release of oxygen through your skin  
b.    Your breath being warmer than the air around it 
           c.    Water from your cells leaving your body in your breath 
d.    A normal breakdown of the cell’s cytoplasm 
 
2.   Why would a runner take off her jacket on a cold day? 
a.    She ate too much glucose before the run  
b.    As her cells break down glucose, they release energy and heat 
c.    As she runs, carbon dioxide combines with water to produce heat 
         d.    Starches combine with sugars to make her sweat 
 
3.   If glucose does not break down in your cells, you will feel: 
a. Tired   




4.   Which of the following would improve an athlete’s performance? 
   a.  Low-carbohydrate snack, low-oxygen environment 
   b.  Low-carbohydrate snack, high-oxygen environment 
   c.  High-carbohydrate snack, low-oxygen environment 
 d.  High-carbohydrate snack, high-oxygen environment 
 
5.   Which of the following describes the role of oxygen in cellular respiration: 
a.  Oxygen is involved in the first stage only 
   b.  Oxygen is involved in the second stage only 
   c.  Oxygen is involved in both of the stages 
   d.  Oxygen is not involved in either stage 
 
6. Cellular respiration in animals is analogous to _________ in plants: 
a.    Water absorption 
b.    Ripening 
           c.    Flowering 






	   81 
The Circulatory System 
 
1.  Oxygen-poor blood is:  
a.    Blue 
b.    Bright red 
           c.    Dark red 
d.    Colorless 
 
2.   Which of the following is true about the heart? 
a. It pushes blood into two different blood vessels 
  b. It removes carbon dioxide from the blood 
c. It is a hollow bag like a balloon 
d. It collects oxygen to send to the lungs 
 
3.   The largest artery in the body is the: 
a.    Aorta 
b.    Atrium 
c.    Vena cava 
         d.    Ventricle 
 
4.   Lack of oxygen in the air you breathe can cause: 
   a.  The heart to pump more slowly 
   b.  The direction of blood flow to reverse 
   c.  Higher levels of oxygen in the blood 
 d.  Higher levels of carbon dioxide in the blood 
 
5. Which of the following causes the blood to flow faster through your body? 
a.    Your stomach needs food 
b.    Your brain needs blood 
           c.    Your muscles need oxygen 
d.    Your body needs sleep 
 
6.   Why do you breath harder when you exercise? 
a.  Because you need more carbon dioxide 
   b.  Because your heart pumps faster 
   c.  Because your blood becomes thinner 
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Digestion 
 
1.  Which of the following is a correct listing of the order of digestive functions? 
a.    Absorption, elimination, chemical digestion 
b.    Mechanical digestion, elimination, absorption 
           c.    Mechanical digestion, absorption, elimination  
d.    Absorption, chemical digestion, elimination 
 
2.   Mechanical digestion of food is started by your: 
a. Esophageal muscles 
  b. Tongue 
   c. Saliva 
d. Teeth 
 
3.   Which of the following would prevent chemical digestion in your mouth? 
a.    An absence of teeth  
b.    An absence of pepsin 
c.    An absence of hydrochloric acid 
         d.    An absence of saliva 
 
4.   Your stomach contains: 
   a.  Peroxide and formic acid 
   b.  Phosphorus and acetic acid 
   c.  Sulfur and nitric acid 
 d.  Pepsin and hydrochloric acid 
 
5. What would happen if a person lost their liver and pancreas? 
a.    They would be unable to digest water 
b.    They would lose the ability to digest fiber 
           c.    They would be unable to digest fats 
d.    They would be unable to produce mucus 
 
6.   Water is absorbed by the: 
a.  Large intestine 
   b.  Small intestine 
   c.  Stomach 
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The Fight or Flight Response 
 
1.  The endocrine system is made up of:  
a.    Chemicals 
b.    Ducts 
           c.    Glands 
d.    Hormones 
 
2.   Which of the following best describes the endocrine system? 
a. It regulates organs using nerve impulses    
b. It is a system of muscles and fibers 
c. It is a system located in our arms and legs 
d. It works using chemical messages 
 
3.   If the product of the endocrine system does not fit a target cell, it will: 
a.    Dissolve in the bloodstream 
b. Move on until it finds a cell that it fits  
c.    Mutate itself in order to fit the cell 
         d.    Mutate the cell so that it fits 
 
4.   Which of the following is a result of releasing adrenaline into the bloodstream? 
   a.  Increase in breathing rate 
   b.  Decrease in sweat production 
   c.  Increase in drowsiness 
 d.  Decrease in heart rate 
 
5. Hormones can regulate activities in organs: 
a.    Close to the gland 
b.    Far from the gland 
           c.    Either close to or far from the gland 
d.    Only if they have ducts 
 
6.   What is the order of the process underlying the Fight or Flight response? 
a.  Nerve impulse, release of hormone, increase in heart rate 
   b.  Increase in breathing rate, release of hormone, brain impulse 
   c.  Recognition of danger, activation of target cells, release of hormone 










Please circle how many of the six (6) test questions you think you will answer 
correctly about the text entitled Causes of Extinction: 
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Please circle how many of the six (6) test questions you think you will answer 
correctly about the text entitled Cellular Respiration: 
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Please circle how many of the six (6) test questions you think you will answer 
correctly about the text entitled The Circulatory System: 
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correctly about the text entitled Digestion: 
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correctly about the text entitled The Fight or Flight Response: 
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Please circle how many of the six (6) test questions you think you answered 
correctly about the text entitled Causes of Extinction: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Please circle how many of the six (6) test questions you think you answered 
correctly about the text entitled Cellular Respiration: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Please circle how many of the six (6) test questions you think you answered 
correctly about the text entitled The Circulatory System: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Please circle how many of the six (6) test questions you think you answered 
correctly about the text entitled Digestion: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Please circle how many of the six (6) test questions you think you answered 
correctly about the text entitled The Fight or Flight Response: 
 















Listed below are the passages you have read and answered questions about. 
Suppose we were to give you another test about the passages.  
Which passages would you want to reread or restudy? 
 
(You will NOT actually restudy the texts or answer more questions-  
we just want to know which texts you THINK YOU SHOULD read or study again 
in order to improve your test score.) 
 





Causes of Extinction Yes No 
Cellular Respiration Yes No 
The Circulatory System Yes No 
Digestion Yes No 









EFFECTS OF GENDER, STRATEGY CONDITION, AND TIME OF JUDGMENT 
 
 Because the initial exploration of the data revealed a statistically significant difference in 
assignment of participants to strategy condition by gender, the analyses were repeated to 
determine whether the effects of strategy condition and time of judgment differed by gender. A 
mixed 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was used, with strategy condition and gender as between-subjects 
factors and time of judgment as a within-subjects factor. Table 4 presents the test scores and 
comprehension judgments by strategy condition and gender.  
 
Table E1 
Test Performance and Comprehension Judgments by Strategy Condition and Gender 
Condition Prediction Test Score Reflection Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Keyword/Male  (n = 17) 0.85 0.08 0.63 0.15 0.75 0.11 
Keyword/Female (n = 36) 0.74 0.13 0.56 0.19 0.65 0.15 
Reread/Male (n = 29) 0.70 0.13 0.57 0.19 0.69 0.15 
Reread/Female (n = 24) 0.73 0.19 0.55 0.16 0.74 0.15 
 
 An ANOVA on mean predictions showed a significant interaction between strategy 
condition and gender, F(1, 105) = 6.71, p = .011, ηp2 = .062. An analysis of simple effects of 
strategy condition on mean predictions revealed a difference between males who generated 
keywords and males who reread text (M = 0.85 vs. M = 0.70), F(1, 102) = 11.92, p = .001, ηp2 = 
.11. An analysis of simple effects of gender on mean predictions revealed a difference between 
males who generated keywords and females who generated keywords (M = 0.85 vs. M = 0.74), 
F(1, 102) = 7.20, p = .009, ηp2 = .066.  
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 An ANOVA on mean test scores showed no interaction effect, F(1, 105) = 0.61, p = .44, 
and no main effects for strategy condition, F(1, 105) = 0.95, p = .33, or for gender, F(1, 105) = 
1.45, p = .23.  
 An ANOVA on mean reflections showed a significant interaction between strategy 
condition and gender, F(1, 105) = 5.88, p = .017, ηp2 = .054. An analysis of simple effects of 
strategy condition on mean reflections revealed a difference between females who generated 
keywords and females who reread text (M = 0.65 vs. M = 0.74), F(1, 102) = 5.27, p = .024, ηp2 = 
.049. An analysis of simple effects of gender on mean reflections revealed a difference between 
females who generated keywords and males who generated keywords (M = 0.65 vs. M = 0.75), 




 Signed differences. Figure E1 presents the signed differences between comprehension 
judgments and test scores by gender and strategy condition.  
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 An ANOVA on signed differences showed that the three-way interaction was not 
significant, F(1, 102) = 0.002, p = .96. The two-way interaction between time of judgment and 
strategy condition was statistically significant, F(1, 102) = 13.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .12. The two-
way interaction between time of judgment and gender was not statistically significant, F(1, 102) 
= 0.19, p = .66. The two-way interaction between strategy condition and gender was not 
statistically significant, F(1, 102) = 1.36, p = .25. Time of judgment, strategy condition, and 
gender did not interact in their effects on signed differences. Gender did not moderate the 
interaction between time of judgment and strategy condition. 
 Gamma correlations. Figure E2 presents the gamma correlations between 
comprehension judgments and test scores by gender and strategy condition.  
 
Figure E2. Gamma correlations by strategy condition and gender. 
 
 
 An ANOVA on gamma correlations showed that the three-way interaction was not 
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in all cases). None of the main effects were significant (p > .05 in all cases).  Time of judgment, 
strategy condition, and gender did not interact in their effects on gamma correlations. 
 
Study Regulation 
 Figure E3 presents the gamma correlations between restudy choices and comprehension 
judgments by gender and strategy condition.  
 
Figure E3. Study regulation by strategy condition and gender. 
 
 
 An ANOVA on study regulation showed that the three-way interaction was not 
significant, F(1, 76) = 0.063, p = .80. The two-way interaction between strategy condition and 
gender was significant, F(1, 76) = 4.49, p = .037, ηp2 = .056. Simple main effects were analyzed. 
For prediction/restudy gammas, there was a statistically significant simple effect of strategy 
condition for males, F(1, 78) = 5.09, p = .027, ηp2 = .061, but not for females, F(1, 78) = 0.042, p 
= .84. Among males in the study, restudy choices were better correlated with predictions in the 
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 The two-way interaction between time of judgment and gender was not statistically 
significant, F(1, 76) = 1.71, p = .20. The two-way interaction between time of judgment and 
strategy condition was not statistically significant, F(1, 78) = 0.20, p = .66. 
 Time of judgment, strategy condition, and gender did not interact in their effects on study 
regulation. Strategy condition and gender interacted in their effects on study regulation. There 








Causes of Extinction 
 
1.  What are some ways in which humans cause extinction? 
 





1.  What happens when humans eat food? 
 
2.  Why are mitochondria called “powerhouses”? 
 
 
The Circulatory System 
 
1.  What determines the color of blood? 
 





1.  Why is the stomach important in digestion? 
 
2.  What happens during chemical digestion?  
 
 
The Fight or Flight Response  
 
1.  Why is the endocrine system called the fight-or-flight response? 
 































































































Figure G5. Keyword analysis for The Fight or Flight Response. 
  
 




Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) is a statistical technique for measuring the relationships 
between words, phrases, and passages (Deerwester, Dumais, Furnas, Landauer & Harshman, 
1990). Common educational applications of LSA include selecting appropriate texts for a given 
learner based on level of reading ability or background knowledge, automatically scoring the 
content of essays and summaries, and helping students effectively summarize textual material.  
 
Essentially, LSA works by first computing the match between a word and a larger body of text 
and then by using factor analysis to decompose the matrix of word-by-context data into a smaller 
set of dimensional factors (Deerwester et al., 1990). For each word that is analyzed using LSA, a 
value is computed that represents the similarity between that word and a user-specified passage 
or context.  
 
Using LSA, the keywords generated by students in Experiment 1 were analyzed. Each of the 
keywords was entered into the one-to-many LSA analyzer (accessible at http://lsa.colorado.edu) 
along with the corresponding passage. For example, the passage, Causes of Extinction, was 
pasted into the analyzer as a comparison text along with the student-generated keywords for that 
passage (e.g., “destruction,” “pollutants,” “poaching,” “habitat fragmentation,” “hunting,” etc.). 
Each keyword was compared to the passage, and a similarity score was computed for each 
keyword. Possible similarity scores ranged from -1 to +1. 
 
Table H1 presents the mean similarity score, the range of similarity scores, the mean score on the 
comprehension test, and the Flesch-Kincaid reading grade level for each of the passages used in 
















Causes of Extinction 0.28 (0.07, 0.41) 0.59 7.5 
Cellular Respiration 0.44 (0.03, 0.61) 0.51 8.2 
The Circulatory System 0.60 (0.00, 0.84) 0.68 6.4 
Digestion 0.58 (0.02, 0.81) 0.64 7.2 














Correlations between Predictions and Scores by Study Condition for Experiment 1  
Measure Keyword Reread 
n M SD n M SD 
Gamma 52 0.09 0.68 49 0.01 0.69 
Spearman 52 0.01 1.77 49 0.21 2.11 
Kappa 55 -0.04 0.14 54 -0.03 0.16 
Pearson 52 -0.42 2.07 49 -0.10 1.23 





Correlations between Reflections and Scores by Study Condition for Experiment 1 
Measure Keyword Reread 
n M SD n M SD 
Gamma 54 0.08 0.60 50 0.15 0.72 
Spearman 54 -0.01 0.90 50 0.03 0.96 
Kappa 55 0.06 0.23 54 0.00 0.18 
Pearson 54 0.04 2.06 50 -0.08 1.35 
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Gamma 
 
Gamma is a non-parametric measure of correlation that is appropriate for measuring association 
among ordinal data (Everitt, 1977). Gamma is based on the difference between concordant pairs 
(C) and discordant pairs (D), and can be computed using the following formula: 
 
G = C - D C + D 
 
Values for gamma range from -1 to +1, with -1 indicating a perfect negative correlation and +1 a 





Spearman’s rank order correlation coefficient measures the strength of non-linear, monotonic 
relationships. It is computed on the ranks of paired measurements on two variables using the 
following formula, where di = (xi  – yi): 
 
Rs = 1 – 
6 Σ di2 




Cohen’s kappa coefficient is a measure of agreement for categorical items. It measures the 
agreement between two raters who classify N items into C mutually exclusive categories. Kappa 
can be computed with the following formula: 
 
K = 
Pr(a) – Pr(e)   
1 – Pr(e) 
 
Pr(a) is the observed agreement among raters, and Pr(e) is the hypothetical probability of chance 





The Fisher Z-transformation can be applied to Pearson’s R when X and Y follow a bivariate 
normal distribution. The transformation is defined by the following: 
 
Z = 0.5ln 
(1 + r)   
(1 – r) 
 
